Respondents 1 to 17 herein (for short ‘the respondents’) filed O.S.No.354 of 2009 in the Court of II Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, against respondents 18 to 70 and the petitioners herein (defendants 3 and 27), for the relief of declaration to the effect that they are the owners and possessors of Acs.7.28 guntas of land, in Sy.No.129/52, and for perpetual injunction. The petitioners filed I.A.No.2461 and 2462 of 2009, individually, with a prayer to reject the plaint under Rule 11 of Order VII C.P.C. Through separate, but similar orders, the trial Court dismissed the same. Hence, these revisions, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

The petitioners contend that the respondents have been litigating for the suit schedule property in one form or the other for the past several decades, and that even after they lost in every forum, they filed the present suit to open another round of vexatious litigation. It is also their case that the suit is barred by res judicata, and by limitation. They contend that the trial Court did not appreciate the matter from the correct perspective and that the plaint is liable to be rejected. Reference is made to various proceedings, that have ensued on earlier occasions.

Sri K. Rama Krishna Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners submits that the question as to ownership and identity of the land and possession over it were decided by this Court, way back in the year 1976, in CCCA No.14 of 1972, and that in turn was followed by several proceedings, such as, LGC Nos.29 of 1992 and 15 of 1996 on the file of the Special Court under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, Hyderabad, and that the trial Court ought to have rejected the plaint, as being without cause of action or as the basis for another round of vexatious litigation. He further pleads that the allegation of fraud made by the respondents, vis-à-vis the judgment in CCCA No.14 of 1972 was dealt with by the Special Court in LGC Nos.29 of 1992 and 15 of 1996, and the findings recorded by the Special Court were affirmed by this Court in its judgment in W.P.No.9931 of 2006.

Learned counsel submits that the suit is barred by limitation and that the trial Court was under obligation to examine that question, closely, as required under Section 3 of the Limitation Act (for short ‘the Act’). He contends that, when a party does not have any independent right, a casual observation made by a Court in an earlier round of litigation cannot constitute the basis for institution of proceedings. He has placed reliance upon certain judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

Sri Sunil B. Ganu, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that the plea of res judicata raised by the petitioners can, at the most be a defence in the suit and cannot be a ground for rejection of a plaint. He contends that the respondents, no doubt, filed LGC Nos.29 of 1992 and 15 of 1996, to enforce their rights, but the Special Court refused to exercise the jurisdiction, and this Court held that the Special Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the matters of that nature. He submits that the petitioners failed to demonstrate as to how the suit was barred by limitation, or to bring it within the other facets of Rule 11 of Order VII C.P.C. He too relied upon certain precedents.

The Code of Civil Procedure prescribes a detailed and comprehensive procedure, that would govern in various stages of civil proceedings, commencing from the institution of proceedings and culminating in execution of the decree. The proceedings in a civil suit commence with the presentation of a plaint. Rule 2 of Order VI C.P.C indicates as to what should be the basic contents of a pleading, meaning thereby, the plaint and written-statement. They are required to contain only “a statement in a concise form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, as the case may be”. It specifically prohibits