The main legal point established in the judgment is the application of purposive interpretation to determine the transfer of pending cases under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.

M. Magannadha Rao, J.- Leave granted.

2. The appellant Bank is the plaintiff in Suit No. 410/85 which is pending on the file of the Caluctta High Court. The respondent debtor is yet to file its written statement. By 31.12.98 as amount of Rs. 31.13 crores is said to be due to the Bank. Initially, in the above suit a compromise decree was passed by Ajit Kumar Sen Gupta, j. on 29.3.94. It was contended by the Bank that the compromise was based upon a non-existent agreement. On appeal, the said judgment was set aside by a Division Bench of the High Court on 11.8.98 consisting of Ajoy Nath Ray and Dipak Prakash Kundu, JJ. describing the said judgment as "shocking". The Bench also observed :

"It was if a contract was being made attempted to be made out for the parties... it is not part of the duty of the Court to make an agreement for the parties."

The Bench allowed appeal, awarding costs in a sum of Rs. 75,000/-

3. As part of the compromise, the learned Single Judge had stayed another suit on mortgage (O.C. (Mortgage) suit no. 77 of 1991) filed by the Bank. But the Division Bench set aside the entire compromise decree.

4. Thereafter, the suit No. 410 of 1985 filed by the appellant Bark stood resorted before the learned Single Judge. In the meantime, the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter called the Recovery Act 1993) came into force in West Bengal. It is stated that it came into force in West Bengal on 27.4.1994. the debtor Company then filed an application T No. 276 of 1999 that this suit by the Bank should remain on the original side of the Calcutta High Court and be not transferred to the Tribunal under the Act. The contention was that on the crucial date, 27.4.1994, the suit was not pending on the original side but the appeal was pending before the Division Bench and that under Section 31(1), appeals did not stand transferred to the Tribunal. It was pleaded that even though the appeal was later allowed on 11.8.98 and the suit was remanded to the Single Judge, it was not a suit "immediately pending" on the original side of the High Court before the crucial date i.e. 27.4.1994, in the High Court, as required by Section 31 of the Act. Therefore, it was not covered by Section 31 of the Act. This was contention in the application filed by the respondent company seeking retention of the suit on the original side of the High Court of Calcutta.

5. The above application filed by the respondent company was allowed by another learned single Judge on 3.9.99 and the Bank's suit was directed to be retained in the High Court on the basis that the Act did not apply. By the same order, the Registrar of the High Court was restrained from transferring the suit to the Tribunal.

6. Against the above order dated 3.9.99, the Bank has preferred the present appeal by special leave.

7. In this appeal, Sri Dhruv Mehta appeared for the appellant Bank and contended that the High Court erred in not transferring the Bank's suit 410/85 to the Tribunal.

8. An additional point has been raised before us by the learned Senior counsel for the respondent company Sri Shanti Bhushan that the debtor company had earlier filed suit no. 272 of 1985 against the Bank in the High Court of specific performance of an agreement with the Bank and for perpetual and mandatory injunctions and that suit was integrally connected with the Bank's suit. It was argued that inasmuch as a suit for specific performance and mandatory injunction could not e transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal, this suit filed by the Bank, namely, suit No. 410/1985 must also remain in the High Court. We asked learned Senior Counsel for the Company and the learned Senior Counsel for guarantor as to whether the said suit by the company (suit No. 72/1985) was or was not a suit, in substance, in the nature of a counter claim and if so, why sub-sections (8) to (11) of Section 19 (as introduced by Act 1/2000 by Parliament) could not apply and as to why we