Earlier awards given by the Additional District Judge in other cases dealing with instances relating to the sale of land in other villages are relevant and admissible in evidence under sections 11 and 13 of the Indian Evidence Act to determine the market value of the land acquired in the present case.

( 1 ) THIS appeal, which is directed against the award given hy the learned Additional District Judge, Mandi on 30th June, 1966 on a reference made under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, initially came up before Hardy, J. who felt that the appeal deserved to be disposed of by a larger Bench. In order to understand the difficulty faced by the learned Judge, it may be stated that the land which is the subject-matter of the acquisition and of the proceedings for payment of compensation is situated in village Tamroh, Tehsil Sadar, District Mandi. The acquisition was made for the cons- truction of Hydel Channel by Beas Sutlej' Link Project Autholities. Notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 30th April, 1964 and under sections 6, 7 and 17 (4) on 24th March, 1965. Land had also been acquiried in villages of Malhanoo, Daan and Rau and in those cases, the learned Additional District Judge had already given his awards. Those villages, it is common case of the parties, are contiguous to village Tamroh and the rates fixed in respect of the land form- ing the subset-matter of those awards were applied to the instant case as well. The learned Single Judge after noticing three mutations Exhibit R. A. dated 8th January 1963, Exhibit R. B. dated 9th March 1963 and Exhibit K C. dated 23d December 1963, on which the Collector had placed reliance, felt that Exhibit R. B. from village Tamroh had an important bearing on the present case because the land covered by the said mutation was of the same quality as the one forming the subject-matter of the present appeal. According to Exhibit R. B. , the rate could not exceed Rs, 300. 00 per bigha. with the result that the rate of Rs. 1,100. 00 per bigna, as fixed by the learned Additional District Judge, was too high. The other question as to how far it was open to the learned Additional District Judge to have relied on the awards given by him in other cases dealing with instances relating to sale of land in other villages, for the purpose of determining the market value of the land acquiied in the case in hand, was also considered to be of importance, though that question was not raised by the learned counsel for the Collector before the learned Single Judge. These questions were considered to require decision by a larger Bench.

( 2 ) THE matter was then after placed before a Division Bench (Kapur and Hardy JJ.) and it appears from the order of the Division Bench that Hardy, J. was inclined 'towards the view that the earlier decisions of the learned Additional District Judge were not admissible in evidence under section 13 of the Indian Evidence Act in proof of the market value of the land in dispute, whereas Kapur, J. was -inclined to take the view that section 13 was of sufficient amplitude to permit the Court to admit those judgments in evidence. Before the Bench, on behalf of the appellant, reliance was placed on a Single Bench,. decision of the Bombay High Court in Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bombay v. Lakhamsi Chelabhai, and on behalf of the respondent, reliance was placed on a larger number of decisions including three Privy Council decisions and two Supreme Court decisions. of course they were. all prior to the decision of the Bombay High Court, in, which most of those authorities were considered and distinguished. It was in these circumstances that the Division Bench considered it proper to refer the matter to a still larger Bench. It appears that before the Division Bench, the only point canvassed was with regard to the legality of taking the awards in the earlier acquisition proceedings into consideration tor the purpose of determining the amount of compensation in the present case. The Division Bench did not consider it necessary to formulate with precision the question to be answered by the Full Bench, though it is quite apparent that all that was desired was that this matter alone may be heard by a Bench of three Judges. It is in