The threat of selling the goods under the impugned trade mark in a specific jurisdiction would confer territorial jurisdiction on the courts in that jurisdiction, and the threat perception or the apprehension on the part of the plaintiff as stated in the plaint would amount to a part of the cause of action.

BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J.

1. The appellant/plaintiff is aggrieved by the judgment dated 27.07.2016 delivered by a learned single Judge of this court in CS(OS) 2266/2013, whereby the learned single Judge, while considering an application (IA No.18636/2013), which had been filed by the appellant/plaintiff under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’), thought it fit to return the plaint itself under Order VII Rule 10 of CPC inasmuch as, according to the learned single Judge, this court did not have the territorial jurisdiction to try the suit.

2. The appellant/plaintiff had instituted the said suit for permanent injunction to restrain the defendant/respondent from infringing the trade mark of the appellant/plaintiff, for passing off, infringing the copyright of the plaintiff, unfair competition, damages and delivery up, etc.. The trade mark of the appellant/plaintiff in respect of its whisky is “Officers Choice”, whereas that of the defendant/respondent is “Regular Choice”.

3. The learned single Judge was of the view that the appellant/plaintiff did not have a registered office in Delhi, its registered office being located in Mumbai. He also observed that the cause of action, if any, had accrued in Andhra Pradesh and not in Delhi. It was also observed by the learned single Judge that the present case fell under S.No.3 in the table given in para 13 of the decision of a Division Bench of this court in Ultra Home Construction Pvt. Ltd v. Purushottam Kumar Chaubey and Others: FAO(OS) 494/2015, decided on 20.01.2016 and, therefore, the suit could have either been filed in Mumbai or in Andhra Pradesh, but certainly not in Delhi. The learned single Judge also observed that the argument of the appellant/plaintiff that it had a branch office in Delhi was not relevant when, according to the learned single Judge, no cause of action had arisen in Delhi. It was also observed by the learned single Judge that the injunctive relief sought by the appellant/plaintiff was not limited to the territory of Delhi, but would have its effect all over India. According to the learned single Judge, a mere apprehension that the respondent/defendant would start selling its whisky under the trade mark “Regular Choice” in Delhi was not sufficient to clothe the courts in Delhi with territorial jurisdiction.

4. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant/plaintiff had a credible apprehension that the respondent/defendant would start selling whisky under the impugned mark and label “Regular Choice” in Delhi. It was submitted that the suit was, inter alia, a quia timet action based on the apprehension that the defendant would start selling the said whisky under the impugned mark and label “Regular Choice” in Delhi.

5. The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff relied on several decisions, including the following:-

(1) Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited v. Natco Pharma Limited: 2014 210 DLT 591 (DB);

(2) Pfizer Product Inc. v. Rajesh Chopra and Others: 2006 (32) PTC 301 (Del);

(3) Win Plast Limited v. Symphony Limited: O.J. Appeal No.32/2015, decided on 27.07.2015 by a Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad;

(4) Shree Nath Heritage Liquor Pvt. Ltd v. M/s Allied Blenders & Distillers Pvt. Ltd: FAO(OS) 368/2014, decided on 06.07.2015 and the connected appeal in FAO(OS) 493/2014;

(5) Exphar SA and Another v. Eupharma Laboratories Ltd & Another: 2004 (3) SCC 688;

(6) M/s RSPL Limited v. Mukesh Kumar and Another: FAO(OS) 145/2016, decided on 03.08.2016 by a Division Bench of this court;

(7) Ultra Home Construction Pvt. Limited v. Purushottam Kumar Chaubey and Others: FAO(OS) 494/2015, decided on 20.01.2016 by a Division Bench of this court.

6. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff was that there was a clear apprehension of launch of the re