IMPORTANT POINTS
The claimant has consciously and voluntarily forgone his right to claim compensation, for reasons best known to him. When a person relinquishes a right available to him with the intention of not reclaiming it, it would amount to abandonment. An abandoned claim cannot be considered as live and surviving. Even otherwise, the proceedings before the Tribunal being inquisitorial in nature, the Tribunal has to find out the truth of the case set out by the parties. In so far as the proceedings involves adjudication of issues relating to negligence, liability in terms of policy of insurance, and otherwise, it may not be possible for a Tribunal to ascertain the truth of the case set out by the parties correctly, if the proceedings are not instituted within a reasonable time, for, in delayed proceedings, the parties may not be in a position to adduce evidence as in the proceedings instituted promptly after the accident, and the possibility of the opposite parties suffering adverse awards on account of the laches on the part of the claimant in approaching the Tribunal promptly, cannot be ruled out.

JUDGMENT :

The insurer in a proceedings for compensation before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has come up in this appeal challenging the decision of the Tribunal in granting compensation to the claimant, on the ground that the claim was not live and surviving.

2. The relevant facts are the following:-

The claimant in the proceedings sustained injuries in a motor accident took place on 02.05.2006 involving a vehicle insured with the appellant. The claim petition was instituted after about 9 years, on 24.03.2015. The owner and driver of the vehicle contested the claim petition contending that they are unable to trace the records of the vehicle. The insurer of the vehicle contested the claim petition contending that the claim petition is not maintainable as the claim is not one which is live and surviving. The Tribunal rejected the contentions raised by the respondents in the proceedings and permitted the claimant to realise a sum of Rs.11,80,800/-by way of compensation from the insurer. As noted, the insurer is aggrieved by the said decision of the Tribunal.

3. Heard the learned senior counsel for the appellant as also the learned counsel for the claimant in the proceedings.

4. The learned senior counsel for the appellant contended that though there is no period of limitation prescribed for preferring applications for compensation before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, the same shall be preferred within a reasonable time. According to the learned senior counsel, the claim petition in the instant case which was instituted after about nine years of the accident can never be treated as one instituted within a reasonable time. It was also contended by the learned senior counsel that a liberal approach in a matter like this, as one adopted by the Tribunal, would cause substantial prejudice to the other parties. The submission of the learned senior counsel, therefore, was that the Tribunal ought not have entertained the claim petition.

5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the claimant submitted that the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 being social welfare in nature, in the absence of any time limit prescribed under the statute, an application for compensation cannot be rejected by the Tribunal as belated. It was also contended by the learned counsel that in a case of this nature, where there is no dispute as to the insurance coverage, there is absolutely no reason for this court to interfere with the decision taken by the Tribunal.

6. I have bestowed my anxious consideration to the facts and the submissions made by the learned counsel on either side.

7. Prior to the introduction of appropriate provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the victims of motor accidents and their legal representatives had to institute suits for realisation of compensation. The period of limitation then was two years for fatal accident claims and three years for other claims. Later, when appropriate provisions were introduced by way of amendment in the said statute, a period six months was prescribed for lodging the claims. Of course, the proviso to sub section (3) of Section 110A of the said Act which prescribed the said period of limitation provided that the Tribunal may entertain an application even after the expiry of six months, if the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application on time. When the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was substituted by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, sub section (3) of Section 166 of the statute provided that no application for compensation shall be entertained by the Tribunal unless it is made within six months. A similar proviso as in sub section (3) of Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was there in sub section (3) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 also which provided that the Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of six months, but not later than 12 months, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the