Rajasthan High Court
Wanchoo C.J. & Modi, J.
Kanhyalal - Appellant
Versus
Ratnkumar - Respondents
Civil Regular Second Appeal Nos. 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59 and 60 of 1954 54
Decided On : February 06, 1956
It is not necessary that the signature in order to be binding should be at the foot of an endorsement. It may be in the beginning or middle of it. The question always is, whether the party, not having signed it regularly at the foot, yet meant to be bound by it as it stood, or whether it was left, so unsigned because he refused to complete it. There is not the slightest suggestion in the present case that K. had refused to put own his signature at the foot of the endorsement because he wanted to leave it unfinished for any particular reason. On the other hand, their is no doubt whatsoever on the evidence led in this case as well as from the conduct of K. that he had put the very endorsements on the hundies to authenticate their sale in favour of the plaintiff. In such a case what matters is the substance and not the outward form of the wording, and so long as the debtors name has been affixed on the document in question in such a way as to make it appear that the document is his and that he is the real author of it, it does not matter what the form of signature is nor is it necessary that the signature must appear in any particular part of the document, and it may appear in any part provided that the intention of the parties is to acknowledge the instrument to be his. (para 7)
The defendant appellant and his father, were in need of funds and they had contacted the plaintiff for the purpose. The plaintiff, however, was not willing to provide the defendant with funds except on some kind of security and defendant Kanhyalal was the person who stood as surety. This arrangement was effectuated by Hazarilal executing certain hundies upon his own firm, Kanhyalal being the rakhia, and these hundies were then and there endorsed by Kanhyalal in the plaintiffs favour although this round about method was adopted by the parties for certain reasons which were best known to themselves. This arrangement clearly imports two things : (I) that consideration had passed from the plaintiff to the defendant Hazarilal through the instrumentality of Kanhyalal and that Kanhyalal had certainly undertaken the position of a surety or an endorser. This would also be the liability attaching to Kanhyalal in consonance with the principle underlying sec. 37 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. (Para 8)
Sec. 8 occurs in Chapter II which deals with arbitration without interven-tion of a court, the procedure as to arbitration in suits is contained in Chapter IV and sec. 25 thereof provides that the provisions of the other chapter shall, so far as they can be made applicable, apply to arbitration under this Chapter. There is, however, a proviso to this section, which clearly states that in any of the circumstances mentioned in sec. 8 and certain other sections the court may, instead of filling up the vacancies or making the appointments, make an order superseding the arbitration and proceed with the ;suit. (Para 9)
The burden of proving that the drawer could not possibly suffer any damage is extremely slight and is easily discharged in a case where the drawer and the drawee are one and the same person. Want of presentment in such a case obviously cannot put the drawer to any loss because he must be deemed to know that the hundi was executed and a certain date was the due date of payment thereunder and that no payment had been made at maturity. (Para 12)
The provision as to adequacy of time for notice of dishonour are in the nature of technical provisions and a strict compliance thereof need not be called for where the Negotiable Instruments Act in terms does not come into operation. The only requirement which may be insisted upon as a matter of principle is that such notice must be given within "reasonable time" having regard to the circumstances of a particular case and the nature of the instrument involved and the usual course of dealing with respect thereto. But the point of importance is that a notice of dishonour must be given so far as the endorser is concerned, which is a matter of principle and not a mere technicality and failure to give a notice of dishonour within reasonable time must absolve the endorser from all liability to the holder. That is the principle which underlies s. 35 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and must be enforced in the case of bundles even though the Act may not, in terms, be applicable to them. This rule is in perfect accord with justice, equity and good conscience because if such a requirement were not to prevail, the endorser may come to know of the dishonour only at such time as the holder may choose to fix at his own sweet-will and pleasure and then it may be impossible for the endorser to do anything to protect his own interest as against the drawee. (Para 17)
The plaintiff in a suit based on a negotiable instrument where he is the endorsee must state clearly in his plaint that a notice of dishonour was sent to the endorser and must give the particulars thereof or where he considers that he is exempt from giving this notice, he should allege the facts which exempt him from giving such notice. The notice may be oral or written but it is necessary that it must have been given within a reasonable time The notice must also clearly intimate that payment was demanded from the drawee but refused and that the holder holds the person notified liable on the instrument. The importance of this requirement lies in the consideration that the giving of a notice of dishonour is a part of the plaintiffs cause of action and is a condition precedent for making the endorser liable and in the absence of such a notice, his liability to the endorsee must stand extinguished. (Para 23)
2. The appeals arise out of nine suits filed by the plaintiff Ramkumar against the present appellant Kanhyalal, and Bansilal and Hazarilal father and son respectively. The plaintiffs case as disclosed in the plaint in case No. 331 of 1949 was that defendants Nos. 1 and 2, namely, Bansilal and Hazarilal being father and son, were members of a joint Hindu family and carried on a joint family business, that they were building contractors and required money in connection with the execution of certain contracts which they had undertaken, and therefore, Hazarilal as manager of the joint family business borrowed a sum of Rs. l,000/- from the plaintiff under the suretyship of defendant No. 3. Kanhyalal, and agreed to pay interest at the rate of 1 per cent per mensem, and in lieu of this arrangement between the parties on Asad Vadi 9, Svt. 2005 (corresponding to the 1st July, 1948) defendant Hazarilal on behalf of himself and his lather drew a Hundi for Rs. 1,000/- which was made payable after 121 days, and defendant No. 3 Kanhyalal was therein mentioned to have deposited the said money ^^jkf[k;k ckcw dUgS;kyky ds ikl** Bansilal Hazarilal drew this Hundi on themselves, the Hundi being Shahjog Hundi, and Kanhyalal defendant appellant is said to have endorsed it on the same day in favour of the plaintiff Ramkumar. The plaintiffs case further was that on the expiry of the "muddat" this Hundi was presented to the defendants for payment on Kati Vadi 10 Svt 2005 (corresponding to 27th October, 1948) but no payment was made, and thus the Hundi was dishonoured. The plaintiff, therefore, brought this suit on the 23rd July, 1949, for Rs. 1,000/-- principal and Rs 90/-- as interest up to the date of suit and prayed for a decree against all the defendants. The Hundies in the other suits namely 332 to 339 of 1949 were executed on Asad Sudi 3 Svt. 2005 (equal to 9th July, 1948j and were made payable 31 days after date, but apart from this difference, the other material facts on which those suits are based are the same. The amounts claimed in these other suits are Rs. 1,000/-principal and Rs. 160/-- by way of interest in each case. There is only one more point of distinction between the Hundi in suit No. 331 and the hundies in the other suits (Nos. 332 to 339) which is material for the purposes of the present appeals and that is that whereas the endorsement on the Hundi in case No. 331, dated Asad Vadi 9 Svt. 2005 by the endorser Kanhyalal bears his signature at the end of the endorsement which was also in his own handwriting, the endorsements on the other Hundies, though they are in the handwriting of Kanhyalal, they admittedly do not bear any signature of his at the foot thereof
3. The suit was resisted by defendant Bansilal on the ground that he had nothing to do with the Hundies in question or with the business in connection with which they were alleged to have been executed and that his son Hazarilal carried on separate business by himself. So far as defendant Hazarilal is concerned, he also supported his father and pleaded that they were not members of a joint Hindu family nor did they carry on any joint business and that they did their business absolutely independently of each other. Hazarilal further denied to have stood in need of borrowing any money from the plaintiff and contended that there were certain speculative or wagering transactions between him and the plaintiff and, therefore, he (Hazarilal) had been prevailed upon to execute these Hundies and that as defendant No 3 Kanhyalal was his (plaintiffs) friend, the plaintiff wanted his name to be entered in the Hundies so that Hazarilal could be precluded from attacking those
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.