Parliament has legislative competence to enact laws dealing with property of the Union, including agricultural land, under Item 32, List I, Union List, and such laws prevail over State laws dealing with the same subject matter.

ORDER :- The petitioners in this case were the sub-lessees of one Behari Lal to whom the land in dispute had been leased by the Military Estate Officer, Delhi Circle, having jurisdiction over the land in dispute which is situated within Ambala Cantonment. This Behari Lal was evicted some time back and it is admitted that till his eviction the lease money was being paid by the present petitioners to Behari Lal and after he had been evicted they did not pay any amount to anyone. Treating them to be unauthorised occupants notice was served on them by the military authorities concerned under Section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 (Central Act 32 of 1958), hereinafter referred to as the Act, and after giving them a hearing the eviction order was passed. They went up in appeal to the District Judge, who is the appellate authority under Section 9 or the Act. The only ground taken before this authority was that the petitioners had not been given propel opportunity. This argument was negatived and their appeal was dismissed. Thereafter they filed the present writ challenging the order of eviction mainly on two grounds. The first that the Act was ultra vires and secondly that the land in dispute being an agricultural land did not fall within the definition of the word premises as given in the Act and that the Parliament is not authorised to legislate in respect of agricultural land which is exclusively within the purview of the State Legislature according to List II, item 18.

With regard to the first point it has already been decided by a Full Bench of this Court in Mount View Hotel v. State of Punjab, Civil Writ No. 16 of 1960, D/-22-1-1963 : (AIR 1963 Punj 290) that the relevant provisions of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1959 (Punjab Act 31 of 1959), were intra vires. As has been submitted in paragraph 8 of the present writ petition, the words of the Punjab Act are modelled on the words of the Central Act, and in view of this Full Bench decision the first point raised in this petition must the negatived.

2. With regard to the second point, it is necessary to refer to definitions of public premises and premises as given in Section 2 of the Act. These are as follows :

"2(b) public premises means any premises belonging to * * *

the Central Government * * * *

(i) * * * * * *

(ii) * * * * * *

(c) premises means any land or any building or part of a building and includes :

(i) the garden, grounds and outhouses, if any, appertaining to such building or part of a building,

(ii) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof."

It is not disputed that the land in dispute belongs to the Central Government. Therefore, if the word land falls within the word premises, then it would be public premises. Now premises means any land. Prima facie, therefore, any type of land - whether it is used for agricultural or other purposes - would be covered by the word premises. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners, however, is that if we compare the definition of the premises given in the Act with the definition given in the Punjab Act, the inference would be that the word land used in the Central Act does not mean to cover agricultural land.

In the Punjab Act premises has been defined as "any land, whether used for agricultural or non-agricultural purposes * * *" The mere fact that in the Punjab Act, which came subsequent to the Central Act, it was made specifically clear that the land would include agricultural or non-agricultural land, would not mean that land as used in the Central Act must necessarily be confined to land other than agricultural land. Without the use of any qualifying words restricting the meaning of land, it should be given its natural meaning as land used for any purpose. The learned counsel, however, contended that the Parliament is not authorised by the Constitution to legislate with regard to

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