The court established that the suspension and prosecution of the petitioner were justified under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and emphasized the authority's discretion in placing an employee under suspension pending a criminal trial.

Satyendra Singh Chauhan and Anil Kumar,JJ.

Heard learned counsel for the petitioner Sri R.B.S. Rathore and Sri Asit Kumar Chaturvedi, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Rupesh Kasmanda for the contesting respondent.

2. Facts, in brief, of the present case are that the petitioner, who was working on the post of Branch Manager in Allahabad U.P. Gramin Bank, Mohammadi Branch, District Lakhimpur Kheri, was caught red handed by the C.B.I for taking bribe, so by an order dated 03.08.2011 (Annexure-2), he was placed under suspension.

3. Thereafter, the petitioner moved a representation dated 13.03.2012 for withdrawal of the suspension order. As the same was not considered, so he approached this Court by filing Writ Petition No.364 (SB) of 2012: Mata Badal Singh vs. Allahabad U.P. Gramin Bank, which was disposed of by an order dated 23.03.2012 with the following directions:

"Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and also without entering into the merits of the case, we dispose of the writ petition finally with a direction to the authority concerned to consider the petitioner's representation dated 13.3.2012 as contained in Annexure No.6 to the writ petition and pass appropriate order, in accordance with law and after affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, expeditiously, say, within a period of three months from the date of receipt a certified copy of this order."

4. In pursuance to the said directions, the representation of the petitioner has been considered and an order dated 18.06.2012 (Annexure-1) has been passed by the Chairman/competent authority of the Allahabad U.P. Gramin Bank regarding the same.

5. Orders dated 03.08.2011 and 18.06.2012 have been challenged by the petitioner by means of the present writ petition. However, in the meantime, the appeal filed by the petitioner against the impugned order of suspension has been rejected by an order dated 21.09.2013, so he moved an application for amendment in the present writ petition, which was allowed. Accordingly, the petitioner has amended the writ petition, challenging the order dated 21.09.2013 passed by the appellate authority.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner while challenging the impugned orders, submits that the petitioner has been placed under suspension for an indefinite period and till date, no charge sheet has been issued to him, so keeping in view the said facts as well as law laid down by Apex Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary vs. Union of India and another (Civil Appeal No.1912 of 2015) decided on 16.02.2015 and no reason has been given by the competent authority for extension of the suspension order, the impugned order of suspension is liable to be set aside. In this regard, he has placed reliance upon Para-14 of the judgment given in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra), wherein it has been held as under:

"We, therefore, direct that the currency of a Suspension Order should not extend beyond three months if within this period the Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet is not served on the delinquent officer/employee; if the Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet is served a reasoned order must be passed for the extension of suspension. As in the case in hand, the Government is free to transfer the concerned person to any Department in any of its officers within or outside the State so as to sever any local or personal contact that he may have and which he may misuse for obstructing the investigation against him. The Government may also prohibit him from contacting any person, or handling records and documents till the stage of his having to prepare his defence. We think this will adequately safeguard the universally recognized principle of human dignity and the right to a speedy trial and shall also preserve the interest of the Government in the prosecution. We recognize that previous Constitution Benches have been reluctant to quash proceedings on the grounds of delay, and to set time limits to their duration. However,