Point of Law: There is nothing in the constitution of the Board to suggest that the affiliation bye-laws have statutory force. The service conditions are in the bye-laws. They are adopted between the parties through the agreement and are binding as a contract. Neither the bye-laws nor the agreement are statutory. If there is any breach of the service conditions then it is the breach of the contract and the parties may file suit or the Board may impose penalty prescribed under the bye-laws but this does not mean that the bye-laws or the agreement have statutory force

JUDGMENT :

1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Abhishek Kumar for the respondent No. 4, Sri H.N. Pandey for the Board and Sri Vivek Ratan Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for NTPC.

2. The respondents have raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition by contending that the same would not be maintainable since the petitioner assails an order of termination made by the D.A.V. Public School. It is submitted that notwithstanding the fact that the school may be said to be performing a public function or discharging a public duty since the terms and conditions of service of the petitioner are not governed by any statutory rule or regulation, a writ petition consequently would not lie. Reliance is placed principally on the Full Bench decision of the Court in M.K. Gandhi and Others Vs. Director of Education (Secondary), U.P., Lucknow and Others, (2005) 3 UPLBEC 2187. The attention of the Court is then drawn to a recent decision rendered by another Full Bench in Roychan Abraham Vs. State of U.P. and Others, (2029) 2 UPLBEC 1148 in support of the objection that is raised. Counsel for the C.B.S.E. submits that the terms and conditions of service of the petitioner are governed by the byelaws framed by the Board which are not statutory and in light of the decision in M.K. Gandhi, the writ petition would not lie.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner however submits that the D.A.V. Public School is funded and aided by N.T.P.C. which is a Government Corporation and State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. He submits that N.T.P.C. has set up and established schools in order to provide educational avenues to the wards of its employees and those of the C.I.S.F. personnel employed in its establishment. He submits that in light of the financial and administrative aid which is provided, it must be held to be performing a public function and consequently a writ petition would be maintainable. Apart from relying upon the ultimate conclusions recorded by the Full Bench in Roychan Abraham, learned counsel also places reliance upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Ramesh Ahluwalia Vs. State of Punjab And Others, (2012) 12 SCC 331 to submit that the aforesaid decision would clearly merit the objection as raised being negatived.

4. In order to evaluate the rival submissions, it would be apposite to firstly consider the judgment in M.K. Gandhi. The Full Bench framed 8 points for determination. Insofar as the controversy that falls for our consideration is concerned, it would be pertinent to note the following issues alone which were framed:-

“...

(i) Whether the DPS School is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution;

(ii) Whether the Board is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India;

(iii) Whether the 'Affiliation bye-laws' have statutory force;

….....

(vi) Whether a writ petition is maintainable against a privately managed school for violation of the Service Rules.

(vii) Whether a writ petition is maintainable against the Board for non-observance of its bye-laws; …...”

5. The Full Bench firstly held that C.B.S.E. is State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. It further proceeded to hold that the affiliation byelaws, of which service conditions form a part, do not have statutory force. This conclusion was recorded by the Full Bench in the following terms:

“31. There is nothing in the constitution of the Board to suggest that the affiliation bye-laws have statutory force. The service conditions are in the bye-laws. They are adopted between the parties through the agreement and are binding as a contract. Neither the bye-laws nor the agreement are statutory. If there is any breach of the service conditions then it is the breach of the contract and the parties may file suit or the Board may impose penalty prescribed under the bye-laws but this does not mean that the bye-laws or the agreement have statutory force.”

6. Proceeding fur