The main legal point established is the discretion of the appointing authority in revoking suspension orders and the limitations on the power of review under the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966.

1. Feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the Madhya Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, the respondent No. 2, whereunder allowing the claim petition of the contesting respondent No/1, the order dated 12-1-2000, placing him under suspension had been quashed, the State of Madhya Pradesh, the employer has now approached this Court seeking redress praying for quashing of the impugned order dated 31-1-2000, passed by the respondent No. 2, the Tribunal.

2. We have heard the learned Government Advocate in support of the writ petition as well as the learned counsel representing the contesting respondent No. 1, and have carefully perused the record.

3. The facts in brief shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of this writ petition lie in a narrow compass : The contesting respondent white he was posted as Van Kshetrapal (Forest Ranger) was placed under suspension vide the order dated 1-11-1996, passed by the Conservator of Forest, the then appointing authority in view of the submission of the challan in the Court of Special Additional District Judge, Gwalior, wherein he was involved in the commission of an offence under section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. This criminal case had been initiated at the instance of the Special Police Establishment, Lokayukt, Gwalior. Later on the aforesaid order placing the respondent No. 1 under suspension was revoked by the Governor vide the order dated 4-2-1998, who by that time was the appointing authority on account of the post held by the respondent No. 1 having been made a gazetted post.

4. It may be noticed that in the order dated 4-2-1998. passed by the Governor while reinstating the respondent No. 1 in service it had been indicated that the further orders in the matter relating to the suspension will be passed after the conclusion of the proceedings pending before the criminal Court of the competent jurisdiction.

5. However, the Governor subsequently purporting to implement the direction contained in the first proviso to rule 9(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966, passed an order dated 12-1-2000, placing the respondent No. 1 under suspension again with immediate effect. This order, whereunder the respondent No. 1 had been placed under suspension for the second time was challenged before the respondent No. 2, the Tribunal on various grounds. The Tribunal even in the absence of any return/reply proceeded to hear the matter being of the view that it could be disposed of at that stage finally; observing that the facts of the case were no longer in dispute. The Tribunal vide the impugned order allowed the claim petition and quashed the order of suspension dated 12-1-2000.

6. A perusal of the impugned order passed by the respondent-Tribunal discloses that what had weighed with it was that the employer could not be deemed to have any right to place a person under suspension twice on the same ground on which he had been placed under suspension which order had been revoked exercising the discretion vested in the employer in this matter and further that the employer could not behave with discrimination and pick out an employee for meeting him out with a different treatment as compared to those employees who although stood at par with him were meted out with a different treatment.

7. The learned Government Advocate representing the petitioner-employer has urged that the grounds on which the Tribunal had quashed the order placing the respondent-employee under suspension are not sustainable in law. In this connection suffice it to say that so far as the plea of discrimination is concerned, the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Chandigarh Administration and another vs. Jagjit Singh and another reported in AIR 1995 SC 70S observed-as follows:

....Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent-authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a wri