Salleh Abas FJ:

We have already allowed the appeal in this case at our sitting on 1 March 1982. Here are our reasons for allowing it. First the facts which are as follows.

Upon a petition presented by the Federal Government on 13 November 1978, a winding-up order was issued by the Johore Bharu High Court on 11 March 1979 ordering the first appellant to be wound up and the second appellant to be constituted provisional liquidator for the affairs of the first appellant.

On 13 April 1980 the first and second appellants issued a writ against the 1st, 2nd and 3rd respondents (Johore Bharu Civil Suit No. 100/80) claiming that a series of transactions consisting of transfers, charges and sales in respect of the first appellant's rubber estate executed before and after the presentation of the petition for the winding order were all invalid. The writ asked for declarations that all these transactions were null and void and for payment of the proceeds of such transactions to be made to the second appellant. On the same date the appellants obtained, upon an ex parteapplication by summons-in-chambers from Anuar J, an interlocutory injunction restraining the first and second respondents from receiving and releasing the proceeds of sale of the estate and restraining the third respondents. This order also required all the three respondents to pay to Court the proceeds of the sale of the estate to be placed on fixed deposit until final determination of the civil suit.

On 26 and 27 April 1980, the third and second respondents applied to the High Court to set aside the order of Anuar J as to interlocutory injunction and payment to Court. The first respondent did not apply to set aside the order presumably because an agreement had been reached that the proceeds of sale held by it amounting to RM4,636,800 were placed on fixed deposit until final determination of the suit (see appellants' solicitors' letter dated 18 December 1981, referred to as MAI in Mokhtar bin Abdullah's affidavit sworn on 17 February 1982). The application of the third respondent, after considerable argument before Yusoff J was withdrawn, on 15 November 1980 by its Counsel, Mr. Puthucheary. In any case the interlocutory injunction and the order could not be effective against the third respondent since the sale of the estate had already been completed and the proceeds were released to the first and second respondents some five months before the order was made. The release was made on 27 November 1979 whilst the interlocutory injunction was only ordered on 13 April 1980. That being the case, the only matter left to be considered by Yusoff J was the application of the second respondent. The learned Judge allowed the application and thus set aside the order of Anuar J as to the interlocutory injunction and payment of the proceeds to Court made against the second respondent. Hence the appellants appealed to us in order to restore that order.

The proceeds of sale received by the second respondent from the third respondent in connection with the sale of the 1st appellant's estate is RM3,410,742.13. The interlocutory order against the second respondent is to restrain them from dealing with this sum and to require them to pay it to Court to be placed on fixed deposit until final determination of the suit. It is obvious that the purpose of the injunction is to ensure the availability of funds at the end of the civil suit so that should the appellants succeed in it they would be able to get their judgment satisfied immediately.

An interlocutory injunction is a temporary and discretionary remedy. To consider whether to grant it or to refuse it the Court is not concerned with the chances of success or failure of the appellants in proving their civil suit at the forthcoming trial, neither is the Court's function to evaluate the evidence and materials before it for that purpose. The Court is simply concerned with what it has to do in the meantime in order to protect the right of th