(delivering oral judgment): I have called for and examined the record of these proceedings in the Sessions Court at Taiping in the exercise of my powers of criminal revision under section 323 of the Criminal Procedure Code for the purpose of satisfying myself as to the correctness, legality and propriety of the summary order of committal for contempt of court made by the learned president against K. Kumaraendran, an advocate and solicitor of the High Court in Malaya, who I shall hereinafter refer to as "the advocate".

This unfortunate episode arose in the course of a criminal case in which the advocate was defending an accused person charged with an offence under section 4 of the Corrosive and Explosive Substances and Offensive Weapons Ordinance, 1958, on March 17, 1975. In the record of these proceedings the learned president in the course of cross-examination of the second witness for the prosecution by the advocate made the following note:

" [The defence counsel was shouting and behaving in a manner which is

most unexpected as he keeps on shouting throughout the whole

proceedings, both to the witness and to the court.]"

The advocate then made an application for the case to be heard before another president and the record in this respect and the ruling of the president appears as follows:

"Defence counsel: I make an application to be heard before any

(sic) P.S.C.

1. The court has informed me that if I misbehave myself, I would be

held for contempt and be locked. [The counsel has shouted again

out of proportion.]

2. I pray for the case to be heard before any court otherwise, I

have no alternative but to discharge myself.

Sgd: Low Hop Bing.

17/3/75.

3. The paramount importance is the interest of the client that this

should be heard before any (sic) P.S.C.

Sgd: Low Hop Bing.

17/3.

Ruling of the court:-

In this case, the learned defence counsel has very unjustifiably

shouted at the witness and notwithstanding the advice of the court has

failed to conduct the case with decorum. The learned defence counsel

has absolutely no regard for both the court, the witness and above all

the sense of justice. Indeed the court has been most restrained in

allowing a great deal of latitude to the learned defence counsel. In

spite of this, the shouting potentialities of the learned defence

counsel has been increasingly manifested. Indeed, with such a behaviour

of the learned defence counsel, the accused has been effectively

deprived of the professional service that he is entitled to on a

counsel-client relationship. That being the case, justice is seen to be

done if, as suggested by the counsel, the learned defence counsel is

discharged.

Having viewed all the circumstances with detachment, I hold that there

is no substance in the application of the learned defence counsel and

is consequently dismissed. If the learned defence counsel so desires,

he may discharge himself.

Sgd: Low Hop Bing.

17/3."

The aftermath of this ruling is recorded in these proceedings thus:

"Accused: I wish to engage another counsel. I wish to discharge my

counsel.

Defence counsel: I am discharging myself.

Court: Defence counsel is discharged.

Sgd: Low Hop Bing.

17/3.

Accused: I am not in the position to carry on with this case in the

absence of a counsel. I wish to retain a new counsel.

Prosecuting Officer: I have no objection.

To 31.3.75 (mention).

Bail extended.

Sgd: Low Hop Bing.

17/3.

Mr. Kumar to Court President: If you say this (referring to my

ruling), outside the court, I will take on (sic) you certainly.

Court: The counsel is committing contempt of court and I am

exercising my summary power and commit him to two days imprisonment.

Sgd: