Edgar Joseph Jr J:

In these two consolidated applications by Rohana bte Ariffin and Hashim Hussin Yaacob, both lecturers in Sociology and Development Studies at the Universiti Sains, Malaysia, the respondent herein, made pursuant to leave granted by Harun J on 21 May 1986, for Orders ofCertiorari to remove into this Court for the purpose of they being quashed two separate decisions dated 10 March 1986 of the Council of the respondent University dismissing their appeals from decisions of the Disciplinary Authority of the respondent University whereby, in the case of Rohana, she was found guilty of a single count and, in the case of Hashim, he was found guilty of four out of six counts, in contravention of certain Rules of the Universiti Sains (Discipline of Staff) Rules, 1979, on grounds of bias, denial of natural justice and error of law apparent on the face of the record, a preliminary objection by Counsel for the respondent was before me.

It was argued that although the applicants had obtained the necessary leave for the commencement of these proceedings and had entered them by filing within the periods limited by O. 53 rr. 1A, 2(1) and 2(2), respectively, they had defaulted in respect of two other requirements. It was said that because O. 53 r. 2(4) requires an affidavit of service to be filed before the motion or summons is entered for hearing, service must, in practice, be effected within 14 days after the grant of leave and since, in both cases, leave was granted on 21 May 1986, such service effected only on 29 October 1986 and the affidavit of service filed only on 3 November 1986, the applications were incompetent and should therefore be dismissed in limine.

Before I embark upon a consideration of the preliminary objection, it may be pertinent to mention certain facts by way of background.

At the time when the applications for leave to commence certiorari proceedings were heard, there were also heard immediately before this, applications by the respondent for transfer of "all proceedings" from the High Court in Kuala Lumpur to the High Court in Penang. In the result, after hearing Counsel for both parties and the Federal Counsel who appeared on behalf of the Attorney General who, although served was not a party, Harun J granted leave to commence certiorari proceedings, made an order amending the originating summonses therein by converting them into originating motions and, lastly, ordered the transfer of the proceedings to the High Court, Penang.

Clearly, therefore, the respondent had, in fact ample notice even before leave was granted that the applicants intended applying for Orders of Certiorari and no question of prejudice could arise nor for that matter could any have been alleged having regard to the circumstances.

I must now revert to the preliminary objection.

In considering the dry question of law posed by the preliminary objection I found it necessary to analyse the procedure governing applications for certiorari.

It is manifestly clear, from the provisions of O. 53 that the applicant for certiorari must clear two hurdles. In the first stage he must seek, by ex parte application, filed not later than 6 weeks from the date of the impugned judgment, order, conviction or other proceeding, the leave of the Court to apply for the order of certiorari and then, if leave is granted, the second stage is the substantive application for the order itself: Order 53 r. 2(1). The applicant or his solicitor must next enter a motion or summons as the case may be within 14 days of the grant of leave: Order 53 r. 2(2). This is done by filing sufficient copies of the motion or summons in the Registry of the High Court within the required period: see Jasabena Sdn. Bhd. v. Beh Heng Poo [1985] 1 MLJ 394. Service of the notice of motion or summons on all necessary parties will then have to be effected: Order 53 r. 2(3), and there must be at least 8 clear days between the service and the day named therein for the hearing: Ord