Mohamed Dzaiddin J

In this contested petition for divorce, the petitioning husband applied by way of notice of motion for a decree of divorce on the ground of the wife's admission in the answer to the petition that their marriage had irretrievably broken down. Alternatively, the petitioner prayed for an order that the issue whether there had been a continuous period of two years' separation immediately preceding the presentation of this petition be tried as a preliminary issue.

On the procedure, Encik Balasundaram, counsel for the petitioner, relied on r 3(1) of the Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules 1980 ('the Rules') which, in so far as it applies to this application, states that subject to the Rules and to any written law, the Rules of the High Court 1980 ('the RHC') shall apply with necessary modifications to the commencement of matrimonial proceedings in, and to the practice and procedure in matrimonial proceedings pending in the High Court. Hence, based on this r 3(1), the petitioner seeks to invoke O 27 r 3 of the RHC (judgment on admission of facts) for this court to pronounce a decree of divorce on the ground of the wife's admission in her answer to the petition. In urging me to entertain this application, counsel drew my attention to s 47 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 ('the Act') which states that, subject to the provisions contained in Pt VI (ie relating to divorce), the court shall, in all suits and proceedings, act and give relief on principles which in the opinion of the court are as nearly as may be comformable to the principles on which the High Court of Justice in England acts and gives relief in matrimonial proceedings. Counsel then relied on the English Court of Appeal decision in Grenfell v Grenfell 1 .

In reply, Encik Kan submitted that this application was misconceived because the Rules are complete and make no provision for this type of application. Moreover, r 3(1) only applies where the Rules themselves are silent.

Without going into the merit of the petitioner's application, at this stage, with respect to Encik Balasundaram, I have to agree with Encik Kan that procedurally, this application is misconceived.

The operative words in r 3(1) are 'subject to these Rules and to any written law' The Rules go further to state that the Rules of the High Court shall apply with necessary modifications to the commencement and to the practice and procedure in matrimonial proceedings in and pending in the sessions courts and the High Courts. In my opinion, the Rules contain a complete set of rules and procedures in matrimonial proceedings under the Act. Where it is intended for the Rules to apply or incorporate the procedure under the Rules of the High Court, the Rules specifically provided for it. For instance, see r 24 and r 25 which state that O 24 r 12 of the RHC (discovery and inspection of documents) and O 26 r 1 of the RHC (discovery by interrogatories) shall apply to a defended cause began by petition. Under the circumstances, I form the view that the use of interlocutory procedure of obtaining judgment on admissions under O 27 r 3 of the RHC in the divorce petition is misconceived.

In passing, I should also point out that this application is quite irregular because it was commenced by motion. An application for an order under O 27 r 3 of the RHC may only be made by summons.

Assuming that I can entertain the petitioner's application for judgment on the respondent's admission in the answer, the next thing I have to do is to examine the pleadings and see if the alleged admissions of fact are clear and that they satisfy the requirements of s 53(2) of the Act. The 1 Supreme Court Practice 1991 at p 488 under 'Admissions of fact' says that such admission may be express or implied but they must be clear. The petitioner's ground for divorce is clearly stated in paras 9 and 10 of the petition. Under para 9, it was alleged that the marriage had irretrievably broken down. By para 10