Gopal Sri Ram JCA:

[1] This appeal concerns the issue of the presumptions that arise in equity when property is purchased in the name of another. The parties to this appeal are a man and a lady. They are not husband and wife. The lady is what lawyers refer to as a "common law wife", an expression that perhaps sounds better than "mistress". But in truth that is what she was - the plaintiff's mistress. The lady is the defendant; the man the plaintiff. The property in question is a dwelling house in Johor Bahru. It was bought and paid for by the plaintiff, a multi-millionaire. He paid RM61,000 for it. He had it registered in the defendant's name. The defendant lived in it. Later, the plaintiff sued to recover the house. He succeeded in the High Court. The defendant appealed to us. We allowed the appeal. The reasons for our decision are now produced.

[2] First the facts. The relationship between the parties dates back to the late 1960's when the plaintiff met the defendant in Singapore. She was a mere child - in her late teens. He was in his thirty's: a successful businessman no doubt equipped with all the wiles that go to make one successful in the world of commerce. He became infatuated by her beauty and obvious innocence. She was an illegal immigrant from Indonesia. Because of her youth and her status she was most vulnerable. The plaintiff took full advantage of that vulnerability. He was a married man. So, he made the defendant his mistress. She could not remain in Singapore because of her status as an illegal immigrant. Yet he did not want to lose her. He found a way. He convinced her to marry her relative - a Malaysian in Johor - to enable her to obtain residence status in Malaysia. That marriage, which was contracted in 1976, was a sham. But it fully served the plaintiff's purpose.

[3] The relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant went on for many years. A child was born. However, from about 1984 onwards, the relationship began to sour. In 1988 the plaintiff demanded of the defendant that she transfer the house to him. She refused. The plaintiff then commenced proceedings both in Malaysia and Singapore. The latter proceedings were in respect of a property in Singapore which had been purchased by monies largely provided by the plaintiff but of which the defendant was the owner at law. The course those proceedings took may be found in [1990] 2 MLRH 582, [1991] 2 MLJ 307; [1990] SLR 1251. In the action that forms the subject matter of the instant appeal the plaintiff's case for the recovery of the house was as follows: (i) he provided the purchase price of the subject property; (ii) the defendant is neither his wife, child nor someone to whom he stood in loco parentis at the material time; (iii) the defendant therefore held the subject property upon a resulting trust in his favour and hence had no beneficial interest whatsoever in it. These contentions were accepted by the learned judge. Judgment was accordingly entered against the defendant and her counterclaim was dismissed.

[4] In arguing the appeal learned counsel for the defendant invited us to disturb the learned judge's finding that the plaintiff had provided the purchase price for the subject property and to hold that the defendant had also contributed to the purchase price. We must decline the invitation. This issue - as to who provided the purchase price - is one of fact depending upon the credibility of the witnesses who testified at the trial. In accordance with well settled principles we will not interfere with his findings because - to paraphrase less elegantly the words of Lord Hoffmann in Ryan v. Jarvis [2005] UKPC 27 - the true or false note in the ring of the evidence would have been more audible to the judge who enjoyed the audio-visual advantage at first instance than we who are confined to the printed record.

[5] But the same approach does not hold when it comes to the drawing of inferences from the proved or admitted primary facts. And wher