Gopal Sri Ram JCA:

The appellant is seeking a reversal of the High Court's judgment refusing to set aside an arbitrator's award. The award relates to claims made by the appellant against four different insurance companies on personal accident policies he had taken out with each of them. Of the four claims, three were dismissed by the arbitrator. He allowed the fourth but awarded interest at 8% per annum from the dated of the award, viz., 17 September 1999 and not from the date of the accident which was on 26 June 1992. Since each claim has its own peculiarities I had better deal with them separately.

But before I do that, there are two matters that I need to attend to. First, I need to set out the issues that the parties to the arbitration formulated for the arbitrator to decide. These read as follows:

Leong Kum Whay v. QBE Insurance (M) Sdn Bhd.

1. Whether the 1st Respondent had waived the requirement of disclosure by issuing the Renewal Certificate dated 11th March, 1992 (CBD-8) without requiring the Claimant to fill and submit a fresh proposal.

2. Whether the said Renewal Certificate has been obtained by the Claimant by misrepresentation and/or non-disclosure of material facts.

Leong Kum Whay v. Malaysia & Nippon Insurans Berhad.

1. Whether the 2nd Respondent had waived the requirement of disclosure by issuing Policy No. 12D/A220/92-002845 dated 13th May, 1992 (RBD 12) without requiring the Claimant to fill and submit a fresh proposal.

2. Whether the said Policy has been obtained by the Claimant by misrepresentation and/or non-disclosure of material facts.

Leong Kum Whay v. The Great Eastern Life Assurance Co. Ltd..

Whether Policy No. PA718839-A dated 13th March, 1992 (RBD 21-25) has been obtained by the Claimant by misrepresentation and/or non-disclosure of material facts.

Leong Kum Whay v. MUI Continental Insurance Sdn. Bhd..

Whether Policy No. VP 0698 M dated 8th January, 1991 (RBD 36-40) has been obtained by the Claimant by misrepresentation and/or non-disclosure of material facts.

Dated this 6th day of July, 1999.

Next, I must remind myself of the kind of jurisdiction that is being invoked here. I do so because there is a great temptation to overlook the fact that an application to set aside an arbitrator's award is not an appeal. The grounds on which an award may be set aside are limited to there being an error of law on the face of the record or some misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. "Misconduct" in this context has no pejorative connotation. It is a word that appears in s. 24(2) of the Arbitration Act 1952. It is one of the grounds on which an award may be set aside. It has been defined as follows by Raja Azlan Shah J in Sharikat Pemborong Pertanian & Perumahan v. Federal Land Development Authority [1971] 2 MLJ 210:

In the law of arbitration misconduct is used in its technical sense as denoting irregularity and not moral turpitude. It includes failure to perform the essential duties which are cast on an arbitrator as such, for instance, failure to observe the rules of natural justice, appearance of bias or partiality. It also includes any irregularity of action which is not consonant with the general principles of equity and good conscience. These illustrations are not meant to be exhaustive. But failure to analyse and appraise the evidence does not vitiate the award on the ground of misconduct. It is only when the evidence is material, relevant and had gone to affect the award that the award will be vitiated. In my judgment the plaintiffs' complaint is sustainable only if the failure to do so had occasioned some irregularity causing a miscarriage of justice that is apparent on the face of the award.

With that I turn to deal with the award in relation to the first claim. This is against QBE Insurance ("QBE"). The original policy was issued on 7 March 1991. It was effective until 6 March 1992. During the currency of this personal accident policy, the appellant had obtained two life insurance policie