Gopal Sri Ram JCA:

[1] There is only one issue in this appeal. It has to do with the quantum of damages in a libel action. The appellants complain that the judge gave too much. The respondents say that it is too little. They cross-appealed. We heard the appeal and cross-appeal on 23 October 2000. The appeal was allowed. The award of damages was reduced. The cross-appeal was dismissed. The reasons for our decision now follow.

[2] There is no dispute about the essential facts. The respondents are a reputable firm of solicitors. They mainly handle commercial matters - both conveyancing and litigation. The appellants owned a piece of immovable property. They had borrowed money and were financially strained. They wanted to sell their property and settle their debts. Initially a purchaser came forward. But appellants aborted the sale because they had received a better offer from another source. A sale and purchase agreement was drawn up. Another firm of solicitors, M/s Paul Ong & Co, represented the buyer. There is no doubt that the respondents acted with utmost propriety throughout the entire transaction. While this sale was on foot, the appellants were once again attracted by another higher offer. They wanted to throw overboard the sale to M/s Paul Ong & Co's client. They engaged another firm of solicitors and instructed them to write a letter to M/s Paul Ong & Co. The letter contained certain allegations against the respondents. It was copied to another firm of solicitors, M/s Kumar, Jaspal & Quah representing the financial institution from which the buyer was obtaining funds to complete the purchase.

[3] The judge found them to be highly defamatory. Of that, there is no doubt. The appellants relied on the defences of justification and qualified privilege. Both defences failed. The judge found the statements in the letter to be utterly false. He rejected qualified privilege on the ground that the appellants had been motivated by malice. His findings are entirely justified in the teeth of the evidence. Based on his findings, the judge awarded the following damages:

(i) RM500,000 against the first appellant;

(ii) RM300,000 against the second appellant;

(iii) RM50,000 against the third appellant; and

(iv) RM150,000 against the fourth appellant.

[4] The reason for the judge's assessment appears in the following passage in his judgment:

The sum awarded against the 1st defendant is more substantial than the other defendants for the reason that she was the fugleman in this entire episode of defamation. The others were merely foot soldiers who followed their leader blindly and without thinking despite the fact that they were all more educated than the 1st defendant. The 2nd defendant was more of a lieutenant to the 1st defendant. She was more involved in this wrong than the 4th defendant. As for the 3rd defendant she was entirely out of the country throughout. She merely lent her name. But nevertheless they are all liable. It is only a matter of degree of their involvement which is relevant in the assessment of damages, and it is on this that the quantum of damages awarded against them is based.

The defamation was made with malice and with ulterior motive to gain certain monetary advantage ie, to terminate the Agreements in order to demand more money out of the purchaser. Such motives and actions by the defendants are deplorable, particularly in this instance, when it consists of the allegation of the plaintiffs in conspiring with others so named to defraud. Such accusation is serious, for if prosecuted and found liable, the plaintiffs may land themselves in jail. The consequence of this defamation must have caused mental anguish and distress to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs were and are advocates and solicitors where reputation of honesty and integrity is a hallmark in their profession. To attack them on this vital element is most humiliating and damaging. Fortunately the publication of these defamatory statements were restricted, but sti