Buhagiar J:

(delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal) :- This is an application for an extension of time for the filing of notice of appeal against the judgment given on a motion by the Official Assignee. The notice of appeal was rejected by the Registrar of the Court of Appeal on the ground that under r. 88(b) of the Bankruptcy Rules 1921 the time for entering the appeal and serving notice thereof is fixed at 14 days from the date of signing, entering or otherwise perfecting the judgment or order appealed.

The ground of appeal as stated in the affidavit filed by the solicitors for the appellant is that under s. 2 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1948 it is provided that the provisions of the Schedule there to shall apply to all matters and proceedings in the Court of Appeal and under r. 11 of the Schedule it is provided that the period for bringing an appeal shall be one month from the date on which the judgment or order appealed against was pronounced, and in the present case the notice of appeal was presented for filing more than 14 days but less than one month after the date of the judgment.

On behalf of the applicant it was submitted that there is a conflict between r. 88(b) of the Bankruptcy Rules, 1921, and r. 11 of the Court of Appeal Rules and that in view of the provisions of s. 10 (2) of the Rule Committee Ordinance, 1948, under which the Court of Appeal Rules were made, the provisions of those Rules should prevail.

In the opinion of this Court there is no conflict between the Court of Appeal Rules and Bankruptcy Rules, 1921; r. 88 of the last mentioned Rules contains general and special provisions; after laying down that the provisions and procedure for the time being in force respecting appeals from the Supreme Court in its ordinary civil jurisdiction shall apply to appeals in bankruptcy, that Rule goes on to make certain modifications, one of which is that in appeals in bankruptcy the time for entering the appeal and serving notice thereof on the respondent is to be 14 days from the date of signing, entering or otherwise perfecting the judgment or order appealed from instead of one month. It is an established principle that unless it is specifically so provided by law, a general provision does not impliedly override a special provision. On behalf of the appellant it was also submitted that the matter is, in any case, not free from doubt and that if the Court accepts that view then special leave to appeal after the expiration of the period of time should be granted, under the provision of s. 531 of the Civil Procedure Code, s. 36(2) of the Courts Ordinance, 1948 and r. 11 of the Court of Appeal Rules.

We do not consider the discretion to extend the time should be exercised in favour of the applicant in this case; we agree with the view expressed by Farwell LJ in Re Coles and Ravenshear [1907] 1 KB (1), at p. 8

A mere slip or blunder on the part of the litigant's legal adviser cannot, in my view, entitle him to anything at all.

In that case Farwell LJ also referred to the case of Re Manchester Economic Building Society 24 Ch D 488, where Cotton LJ at p. 499 said:

This, I think, may be laid down, that, when the Rules and the Act of Parliament say that an appeal is to be within a certain time unless special leave shall be given by the Court of Appeal to appeal after that time, the Court does not grant leave unless there is something which, in the opinion of the Court, entitles the person who applies for extension of time to be relieved against the bar established by the Orders and the Act of Parliament. It has been called an equity, but that is not a proper term; it is something which entitles him to ask for the indulgence of the Court to ask to be relieved from the legal bar that there is in the Orders and Act of Parliament.

(See also opinions to the same effect expressed in International Financial Society v. City of Moscow Gas Co. 7 Ch D 241).

For the above reasons the application is dismissed with costs.

Applicat