Wan Suleiman FJ (delivering the judgment of the Court):

This appeal came up for hearing on the 9 August 1978 when it was dismiss with costs.

Seven of the respondents/defendants had successfully applied in the High Court for the particulars contained in the appellant's reply to be struck out, it also being ordered that appellant (plaintiff in the Court below) should also file fresh particulars in compliance with O. 19 r. 22, and on the application of six of them it was also ordered that appellant's allegations in paras. 9 and 10 of the statement of claim as to conspiracy and her claim for damages for conspiracy be struck off. The respondents who were represented by Counsel were also awarded costs.

This is an appeal against the orders so made.

In her amended statement of claim, the appellant, the Research & Publication Manager of a Stock Exchange claimed damages from the Stock Exchange for breach of contract of service, and from the second to eighth defendants who were Directors of the Exchange, and the ninth defendant, its General Manager for damages for conspiracy to defame, and lastly against second to ninth defendants, or each of them or alternatively against the Exchange damages for libel.

The defence of second to eighth defendants may be briefly summarised thus - that the summarily terminating of her service by the letter of 18 December 1974 was because her recent unsatisfactory conduct which constituted breaches of her contract of service was sufficient to warrant her dismissal, and that in any event the words contained therein were not defamatory of the plaintiff.

The ninth defendant said that being only an employee of the company he was in no way concerned with the matters complained of in her statement of claim, and that even if he was responsible for the letter complained about, such action on his part was privileged and in addition the words complained of were true.

In para 2 of her reply appellant filed particulars which ran into 61 pages, regarding which the learned trial Judge had said, 'there is no necessity at all to set out evidence which properly should be adduced at the trial".

Mr Wong for the appellant summarised the three grounds of appeal thus:

(1) was the Judge correct in striking out the particulars?,

(2) was he correct in holding that there was a merger of conspiracy and libel?, and

(3) costs.

It was submitted that in filing the particulars appellant was acting pursuant to O. 19 r. 22, which reads:

Wherever it is material to allege malice, fraudulent intention, knowledge, or other condition of the mind of any person, it shall be sufficient to allege the same as a fact without setting out the circumstances from which the same is to be inferred:

Provided that where in an action for libel or slander the defendant pleads that any of the words or matters complained of are fair comment on a matter of public interest or were published upon a privileged occasion, the plaintiff shall, if he intends to allege that the defendant was actuated by express malice, deliver a reply giving particulars of the facts and matters from which such malice is to be inferred

The objection to the particulars filed is that it contravenes O. 19 r. 4 (Pleading to contain and contain only material facts but not the evidence by which they are to be proved). He referred to the Grounds of Judgment wherein the learned Judge remarked, "It is true that a substantial part of the particulars are matters which may be properly set out but the particulars that are clearly evidence and which strictly should not appear and ought to be struck out seem to occupy a greater portion of those particulars."

In a later passage, his Lordship remarked, "Fundamentally she had gone beyond what is required by the proviso of O. 19 r. 22 particularly in the light of r. 4 which provides that only the material facts must be pleaded but not evidence by which they are to be proved." Mr. Wong felt that the Judge should merely have expunged