JUDGMENT

Yong Pung How CJ:

This was an application to the Court of Appeal for an extension of time to appeal against a Court order on ancillary matters, due to a misreading of the Rules of the Supreme Court by the applicant's solicitors.

The parties were married in October 1965. On 29 October 1985, after being married for some 20 years, a divorce petition was filed by the wife. On 16 October 1986, a deed of reconciliation (the "deed") was entered into by the parties, and this was followed by an application by the husband by way of summons-in-chambers for the Court to approve the deed pursuant to s. 90 of the Women's Charter. At the hearing of the summons-in-chambers on 31 October 1986, the wife was absent. On the instructions of the Court, a letter was written to her by the husband's solicitors to draw her attention to the Court proceedings and on 27 November 1986, she appeared in person and tendered a written submission. As it appeared from this that she was alleging that the deed had not been entered into freely, the Court did not give its approval to the deed. Subsequently, her divorce petition was withdrawn by consent on 8 June 1989.

On 15 August 1989, a divorce petition was then filed by the husband, and on this petition a decree nisi was obtained and later made absolute on 18 December 1990. Before the decree was made absolute, the ancillary matters came before a Judicial Commissioner on 26 November 1990. After hearing the parties the learned Judicial Commissioner ordered that custody of the children be given to the husband with reasonable access to the wife; and he ordered that some rosewood furniture be given to the wife absolutely; but he made no order on maintenance for the wife, and no order, as to costs. This Court order, in particular the portion relating to maintenance, was the subject of an intended appeal. For this purpose, the notice of appeal would have had to be filed and served under O. 57 r. 4 within one month of the date of the Court order, that is, on or before 26 December 1990. Unfortunately for the wife, her solicitors were of the mistaken impression that O. 3 r. 3, under which the period of the Court vacation in December is excluded from the time for filing and service of any pleading, also applied to a notice of appeal. The solicitors made two attempts at filing the notice of appeal on 7 January 1991 and 9 January 1991, but each time the Court registry declined to accept it as it was out of time. On the latter date, the solicitors were instructed to see the Assistant Registrar on 16 January 1991. On that date, the Assistant Registrar ruled that a notice of appeal was not a "pleading" within O. 3 r. 3. The solicitors for the wife wrote to the solicitors for the husband for consent to an extension of time for them to file the notice of appeal, but they did not agree to this. An application was then made by the wife by way of a summons-in-chambers for an extension of time. The application was heard by Thean J on 21 January 1991 and was adjourned to 4 February 1991 to enable affidavits to be filed. On 23 January 1991, the wife's solicitors told the husband's solicitors that they were not proceeding with the application and the application was withdrawn on 4 February 1991.

On 29 January 1991 the wife then filed an originating motion no. 9 of 1991 for an extension of time to appeal against the Court order of 26 November 1990. This was heard by Chao J on 8 February 1991, when he adjourned the hearing to 12 February 1991 for further authorities to be submitted on jurisdiction. On 25 February 1991, after reserving judgment the learned Judge dismissed the motion as he had decided that the application to extend time must be made to the Court of Appeal. On 28 February 1991, a fresh originating motion no. 19 of 1991 was filed by the wife. On 5 April 1991, Chao J sitting as a single Judge of the Court of Appeal heard the application and ruled that the motion be adjourned for hearing before the full Court of Appeal.

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