In this application for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, Lee Kew Sang (the applicant), challenges the validity of a detention order dated 24/9/2003 made against him pursuant to the provisions of section 4 of the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969 ('the Ordinance').

The impugned order was in the following terms:

BAHAWASANYA saya, berpuashati yang Perintah Tahanan adalah perlu dibuat ke atas orang yang namanya tersebut di bawah ini dengan tujuan:

(b) menghapuskan kekerasan *

(c) mencegah jenayah melibatkan kekerasan *

NamaNombor

Kad Pengenalan

LEE KEW SANG611104-01-6051

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MAKA, OLEH YANG DEMIKIAN, pada menjalankan kuasa yang diberi di bawah Seksyen 4(1), Ordinan Darurat (Ketenteraman Awam dan Mencegah Jenayah) 1969, saya dengan ini memerintahkan suapaya orang yang namanya yang tersebut di atas ditahan selama dua (2) tahun mulai dari 24 haribulan September 2003 di Pusat Pemulihan Akhlak, Simpang Rengam, Johor atau dimana-mana termpat lain sebagaimana yang diarah dari semasa ke semasa.

Diperbuat pada 24 haribulan September 2003

(DATO' CHOR CHEE HEUNG) TIMBALAN MENTERI DALAM NEGERI MALAYSIA

Before me, the ministerial order was attacked on two grounds,

namely:

i) The Deputy Minister of Home Affairs did not consider

whether criminal prosecution ought to be taken against the

applicant; and

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ii) The ground of detention was stale and remote in point of law to support detention under the Ordinance.

Turning to the first ground, the point taken on behalf of the applicant was that there was only one specific charge against the applicant and this offence falls squarely within a prescribed offence under the Penal Code. For easy reference, the allegation of facts against the applicant that were attached to the detention order which contained the specific charge is reproduced as follows:

"Bahawa kamu pada 5.2.2003 jam lebih kurang 7.55 malam berhampiran rumah dialamat no, 52 Jalan Gunung, Taman Gunung Emas,Ulu Tiram, Johor Bahru, Johor, bersama beberapa orang lagi rakan sejenayah dengan masing-masing bersenjatakan parang telah terlibat dalam pergaduhan dengan sekumpulan lelaki cina.Akibat dari tetakan dari kumpulan kamu seorang mangsa telah meninggal dunia di kawasan semak berhampiran".

Learned counsel submitted that there was no evidence that the Deputy Minister had considered the possibility of launching a criminal prosecution against the applicant. To support his argument, learned

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counsel cited the case of Murugan s/o Palanisamy & Ors v Deputy Minister of Home Affairs & Ors [1999]6 MLJ 334. There, His Lordship Zulkefli J had this to say at page 340 of the report:

"My second ground in allowing the application of the applicant for writ of habeas corpus is pivoted on the argument that the Deputy Minster in his affidavit has failed to consider and state why should not be a criminal prosecution instituted against the applicant bearing in mind that there is only one offence involved and this offence falls squarely within a prescribed offence of armed robbery under the Penal Code."

And further down, His Lordship said:

"I am of the view that the ordinary criminal process is not to be circumvented or short circuited by ready resort to preventive detention. It is accepted that in some cases it may not be possible to bring the offender to book on account that witnesses do not come forward to depose against him out of fear or it may not be possible to collect all the necessary evidence without unreasonable delay and expenditure to prove the guilt of the offender beyond reasonable doubt. However, the failure of the detaining authority to consider and state the possibility of launching a criminal prosecution may, in

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the circumstances of the case lead to a conclusion that the detaining authority had not applied his mind to the vital question whether it was necessary to make such an order when an ordinary criminal prosecution could well serve the purpose. I am of the view that if the detaining authority fai