2006 MarsdenLR 3349
HIGH COURT MALAYA, SHAH ALAM
SURIYADI HALIM OMAR J
PP
versus
ISKANDAR MOHAMAD YUSOF
CRIMINAL TRIAL NO. 45-36-2001
Decided On : 04-19-06
For the accused - Rajpal Singh; M/s Jasbeer Nur Hakimah & Rajpal
For the prosecution - Salim Soib DPP
Suriyadi Halim Omar J:
[1] The accused person had been charged under s. 39B(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 for the offence of trafficking 3,132.5 grams of cannabis before me. The offence had been committed on 5 June 1999 at about 11.30pm at Jalan Satu, Taman Greenwood, Daerah Gombak, Selangor Darul Ehsan. To succeed the prosecution had to establish, inter alia, that the drugs were possessed by the accused person, they were dangerous drugs as scheduled under the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, the weight tallied as in the charge, and he had trafficked them.
[2] The charge reads:
Bahawa kamu pada 5 Jun 1999, jam lebih kurang 11.30 malam di Jalan Satu, Taman Greenwood di dalam Daerah Gombak dalam Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan, telah memperedarkan dadah berbahaya, iaitu seberat 3,132.5 gram Canabis dan oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya, 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B(2) Akta yang sama.
[3] The prosecution's case was that, on 5 June 1999, SP5 at about 10pm had held a meeting with her officers in preparation of a drug bust at Jalan Satu, Taman Greenwood, Gombak, Selangor (hereinafter referred to as "place of ambush"). By 11pm the police party had positioned themselves in their respective cars at the place of ambush and thereafter waited for the quarry. At about 11.30pm they saw a motorcycle bearing registration number WEC 3110 approaching. It was ridden by a male person later identified as the accused person. He had stopped at the ambush spot, whereupon SP5 forthwith alighted out of her car and simultaneously uttered "police". She had also flashed her authority card at about the same time. At that instance the accused person attempted to speed off but failed as a member of the police party had managed to grab the rear of the motorcycle. A struggle then ensued culminating with the accused person being arrested. They found nothing incriminating on him but found a bag, in which was found 4 packages suspected of containing drugs, near the motorcycle. The police found no one else at the scene. At the scene the police party seized the abovementioned bag, a white helmet and the suspected drugs.
[4] In the course of the police investigation the chemist (SP1) confirmed that the seized suspected drugs were cannabis weighing 3,132.5 gram. In time pictures of the seized items were taken by the police. Later for some reason or other the police lost the bag, the white helmet, the pictures and the negatives, whilst in the custody of the police, much to the chagrin of the accused person.
[5] The prosecution had called 8 witnesses to prove its case, and at the end of the prosecution case, having been satisfied that a prima facie case had been established, I thereupon called the defence. What prima facie means I can do no better than quote the following from Looi Kow Chai & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [2003] 1 CLJ 734:
The correct test to be applied in determining whether a prima facie case had been made out under s. 180 of the Criminal Procedure Code (and this would apply to a trial under s. 173 of the Code) was that as encapsulated in the judgment of Hashim Yeop Sani FJ (as he then was) in Dato' Mokhtar bin Hashim Anor v. Public Prosecutor. Therefore, a judge sitting alone under s. 180 of the CPC must subject the prosecution evidence to maximum evaluation and to ask himself the question 'If I decide to call upon the accused to enter his defence and he elects to remain silent, am I prepared to convict him on the totality of the evidence contained in the prosecution case'. If the answer was negative, then no prima facie case had made out and the accused would be entitled to an acquittal. Subjecting the evidence of the prosecution to maximum evaluation to determine if the defence was to be called did not mean that the prosecution had to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt at this intermediate stage.
[6] I had called the defence as, amongst others, I was sati