Gopal Sri Ram JCA:

[1] We allowed this appeal on 16 January 1995, for the reasons that follow.

As to each of us any notice may be served on each of us or on the legal personal representative of each of us either personally or by sending the same through the post in an envelope addressed to the above mentioned address or the last known place of address of the person to be served, and a notice so sent shall be deemed to be served on the day following that on which it was posted.

[3] Default in repayment having occurred, the respondent, on 18 October 1989 sent out a letter of demand to each of the appellants. The letter to the first appellant was addressed to him at 86, Jalan Theatre, Ipoh, while that addressed to the second appellant bore the address 'No 5, Jalan Chung Ah Moi, Chateau Garden, Ipoh'.

[4] The respondent heard nothing from either appellant. So, on 15 November 1989 it issued a writ accompanied by a statement of claim against the borrower and the guarantors and on 11 January 1990 and 5 June 1990 the respondent obtained judgment against the first and second appellant respectively, for their alleged default in entering an appearance to the writ. On 4 March 1991 the appellants took out a summons to set aside the default judgments entered against them. In para 17 of the affidavit of the second appellant affirmed on 2 March 1991 and filed in support of the summons, the appellants alleged that no demand had been made on them. The question of there having been no demand made in accordance with the terms of the guarantee was therefore squarely raised. On 15 February 1993 the Court set aside the default judgment against each appellant and they then delivered their defence to the action on 25 February 1993.

[5] On 11 May 1994, that is to say, after a lapse of almost fifteen months after the last proceeding in the cause, the respondent took out a summons for judgment. The affidavit supporting the summons gives no explanation for the long delay in making this application. The appellants opposed the summons by way of an affidavit in which they, not surprisingly, asserted that they had not received any demand from the respondent. They also alluded to the fact of the judgment in default having been set aside. The respondent did not file any affidavit in answer to the allegations made by the appellants. In particular, there was no explanation proffered by the respondent for having sent the letters of demand to addresses different from that appearing in the guarantees. Neither was any affirmative proof offered of the letters of demand having been served on the appellants by the rather simple method of exhibiting the A R cards as evidence of receipt.

[6] The respondents' summons came on for hearing on 7 July 1994 before Judicial Commissioner Kang Hwee Gee. The appellants argued that they had never been served with the letters of demand. They also submitted that the very same issues as those raised on the summons for judgment had been raised and ventilated at the hearing of the summons to set aside the judgments in default. The appellants also relied on the respondent's delay exceeding one year since the last proceeding which they said attracted th