Judges are not disqualified from hearing cases solely based on past associations with counsel, which do not inherently present a real danger of bias.

Introduction

[1] These are my grounds in respect of an application for recusal by the 1st defendant (encl 31). The imperative question that arises in the context of the recusal application is whether the fact that the presiding judge and counsel appearing for one of the parties were partners in the same law firm more than a decade ago, is a ground for disqualification/recusal of the presiding judge.

Request For Recusal

[2] The matter was fixed for trial on 22 March 2016 and 23 March 2016. The issue of recusal was brought up orally in open court on the morning of 22 March 2016 when the 1st defendants counsel referred to a letter dated 21 March 2016 issued by Messrs Zulkifli Yong Azmi & Co to the plaintiffs solicitors, Messrs Mohanadass Partnership. The letter was sent on the eve of the trial, ie on 21 March 2016 and it reads as follows:

"... we have our clients instructions to state as follows:

a. Our client has reason to believe that Mr Mohanadass was attached at Shook Lin & Bok as a Legal Assistant since 1991 and thereafter as a Partner since 1999, until his setting up of your esteemed firm in 2010.

b. Our client has reason to believe, around that similar period of time, Yang Arif S Nantha Balan was also attached at Shook Lin & Bok as a Legal Assistant and/or Senior Legal Assistant and/or Partner before His Lordship continuation of career at Messrs Zul Rafique & Partners,

c. Due to the above, our client therefore has reason to perceive that your Mr Mohanadass and Yang Arif Justice S Nantha Balan, being colleagues for a vast number of years in the same legal entity, would give rise for our client to be concerned as to whether His Lordship should recuse himself from hearing the above matter.

Your goodselves would appreciate that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done, and therefore, we seek your goodselves confirmation in avoiding the need to file any necessary formal application to that effect in order to avoid any unnessessary embarrassment for all parties having to be placed on record ..."

[3] When the matter was brought up on 22 March 2016, I informed the parties that Mr Mohanadass Kanagasabai, the plaintiffs counsel, and I were indeed partners at Messrs Shook Lin & Bok ("the firm") for a period of time, until I left the firm at the end of January 2003.

[4] The plaintiffs counsel, Mr Mohanadass objected to the 1st defendants recusal application being made orally. The 1st defendants counsel then applied for an adjournment of the trial in order to file a formal application for recusal. The counsel for the plaintiff then objected to the adjournment as parties were ready to proceed with the trial. He pressed for costs of the day. Upon hearing both parties, I awarded that costs of the day in the sum of RM7,500.00 be paid (in any event) by the 1st defendant to the plaintiff.

[5] After the matter was adjourned, the 1st defendant filed a formal application for my recusal. The application for recusal (encl 31) is predicated on the sole ground that the plaintiffs counsel, Mr Mohanadass Kanagasabai and I were partners in the firm for a period of time, until I left in January 2003.

[6] In the context of the test for bias, the question before me is whether a fair- minded person, sufficiently apprised of all relevant facts would opine that there was a real danger of bias by reason of the fact that the presiding judge was previously a partner in the same law firm as the counsel appearing for one of the parties.

[7] Consequently, it is relevant to ask whether because of the judges familiarity with one of the counsel appearing before h