An appellate court will not interfere with a trial judge's damage assessment unless based on erroneous legal principles or factual misapprehension.

[1] The appellant's appeal concerns the assessment of damages ordered by the High Court at Shah Alam on 16 April 2013, resulting from a claim on medical negligence. The appellant, an infant suing through her father as her next friend, suffered from Quadriplegic Spastic Cerebral Palsy ("QSCP") arising from child birth and treatment at the 1st respondent's hospital. At the date the matter was set for trial at the High Court, liability was agreed between parties and the trial proceeded only on the issue of damages. At the end of the trial the learned High Court Judge awarded a total sum of RM1,193,442.39 as damages together with interest and costs.

[2] The appellant contended that the sum awarded by the learned judge was manifestly low. Dissatisfied with some of the items of damages not taken into account, the appellant lodged this appeal which came before us on 24 February 2014. We have unanimously dismissed the appeal and our reasons are set out below.

[3] For convenience, we produce in extenso the damages as ordered by the learned High Court Judge:

"Ganti rugi khas

Ganti rugi pra-bicara

kos kenderaan

Ganti rugi am

Ganti rugi am masa depan

Faedah

Kos

Principle In Assessing Damages And Appellate Interference

[4] It is trite law that an appellate Court will not interfere with the decision of a trial judge unless it is satisfied that the judge has acted on a wrong principle of law or has made a wholly erroneous estimate of damage suffered either due to an omission to consider relevant materials or an admission of irrelevant considerations ( Tan Kuan Yau v. Suhindrimani Angasamy , 1985 MarsdenLR 649 ; ).

[5] The purpose of award of damages is to provide monetary compensation for the harmful consequences suffered by the injured. Damages for personal injuries cannot be punitive and still less a reward (see Ong Ah Long v. Dr S Underwood , 1983 MarsdenLR 58 ; . Hence it must be taken as compensatory and not to punish a defendant or even to make him a lesson for others. In Yang Salbiah & Anor v. Jamil Bin Harun, 1981 MarsdenLR 181 , the Federal Court after stating the principle and purposes of damages went on to state that "damages must be fair, adequate and not excessive". In doing so the Court would have to address its mind to the harm, injury, damage or loss suffered by the appellant, not the nature of defendant's neglect, act, or omission. The appellant on the other hand is under a duty to mitigate the loss he suffered.

[6] Mindful of the above principles, we find judgment of the learned trial judge was in adherence. The learned judge had, at the forefront of her mind the compensatory principle and had generally conducted her assessment on that principle and other accepted principles. The learned judge further reminded herself that a claim for damages cannot be made with an objective of enriching one self.

[7] We listed below our deliberation on each of the items complained by the appellant.

Special Damages - Care By Parents

[8] The learned High Court Judge disallowed the claim for cost of nursing care provided by the appellant's mother from birth until about two years old. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned trial judge fell into error by relying on her own personal opinion and failed to give due regard to an expert opinion on this matter as stated in Bolitho v. City and Hackney Health Authority [1997] 4 All ER 771.

[9] Upon our scrutiny of the judgment we find that Her Ladyship dismissed this item of claim because she found from the evidence and the circumstantial surrounding facts, that the care for the appellant from birth to age two was not different from that of a normal child. In coming to this finding the l