Tan Ah Tah CJ:

The appellant was convicted on 18 May 1965 of the murder of one Jenny Cheok Cheng Kid (hereinafter referred to as Jenny) and was sentenced to death. He now appeals against that conviction.

According to the prosecution the offence was committed on 27 August 1963 at about 5 p.m. at sea near two islands called Pulau Dua which are also known as the Sisters Islands. The appellant had hired a sampan from a boatman called Yusof and on his directions Yusof had taken both the appellant and Jenny to a place between the two islands where he dropped anchor. The appellant stated in evidence that his object in going there was to collect corals and that Jenny was to assist him in doing so. According to the prosecution this was only the ostensible reason for going there; the appellant's real intention was to murder Jenny and in pursuance of that intention he assisted Jenny to put on the diving equipment which had been brought in the sampan and allowed her, a novice diver, to go down alone, wearing a flipper which had previously been cut, into waters which he knew were dangerous and hazardous with the result that she met her death.

The evidence relied upon by the prosecution was wholly circumstantial. For that reason it is relevant to set out the more important facts and circumstances which the jury were in a position to find, if they decided to do so, from the evidence. These facts and circumstances were as follows: -

(1) The appellant had been made a bankrupt in October 1962 and was still a bankrupt on 27 August 1963, being the day on which the offence was alleged to have been committed. He was in need of money and that could be a motive for the crime.

(2) On 27 August 1963 Jenny was insured against accidents with several insurance companies, the total sum being $450,000.

(3) One of the insurance policies under which Jenny was insured for the sum of $150,000 had lapsed on 26 August 1963 but was renewed by the appellant on the morning of 27 August 1963 for another five days. The appellant, however, did not renew or extend his own insurance policy which had been taken out at the same time.

(4) Another one of these insurance policies, which was for the sum of $100,000, was due to expire on 28 August 1963.

(5) The beneficiary named in some of the policies was the appellant's mother. In the case of the other policies the benefit was to go to Jenny's estate.

(6) Jenny, who was 22 years of age and was a bar waitress earning $90 per month and about $10 in tips per day when she worked, made a will on 7 August 1963 in which the appellant's mother was named as the sole beneficiary. The appellant accompanied Jenny to the solicitor's office when instructions for the preparation of the will were given to the solicitor.

(7) Jenny had only a little experience of what is called scuba diving and might fairly be described as a novice scuba diver. This was known to the appellant, although he claimed that she had made good progress under his tuition.

(8) On 27 August 1963 the appellant allowed Jenny to go down into the waters near Pulau Dua alone. According to an expert witness, it was not safe for a novice to scuba dive alone.

(9) The waters near Pulau Dua were dangerous and hazardous. The appellant had dived in these waters on previous occasions and was in a position to know this.

(10) The appellant did not go down into the water himself even after Jenny had failed to come to the surface.

(11) Jenny did not wear gloves when she went down into the water. This could be inferred, if the jury decided to do so, from the fact that the two pairs of gloves which had been brought by the appellant on that occasion were still in his swimming-bag. Gloves were usually worn when looking for corals in order to prevent the hands and fingers from being cut. It was of course for the jury to decide whether the gloves produced in Court were the very same gloves which were in the appellant's swimming-bag on 27 August 1963 . The jury were in a p