Mohd. Hishamudin Mohd. Yunus J:

This is a land reference case under s. 38 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1960 . The property in question is Lot No. 1830, located in the Mukim of Kuah, District of Langkawi, Kedah (the "subject lot"), and having an area of 12,251 square feet. It is a freehold land, and the category of land use is that of 'building'. The date of acquisition is 17 October 1991. The award of the collector was RM13.65 per square foot. The applicants/owners were dissatisfied with the award. They contended that the award should have been RM20 per square foot.

Both sides had submitted a valuation report prepared by their respective valuer. However, at the commencement of the hearing of this case, the learned Counsel for the applicants, Encik Tan Chen Sing, objected to the admissibility of the respondent's valuation report (i.e. the report of the government valuer) on the ground that it was served on the applicants only ten days before the date of hearing instead of the twenty-one days, and therefore there was noncompliance with Practice Direction No. 11 of 1987. After having given the Senior Federal Counsel, appearing for the respondent, the opportunity to reply, I upheld the objection.

Be that as it may, I had dismissed this application with costs on the ground that the applicants had failed to establish a prima facie case.

It is a basic principle that the onus is always on the landowner/applicant to establish a prima faciecase in regard to his claim for a higher compensation; there is no legal burden on the collector/respondent to justify his award. However, should the applicant succeed in establishing a prima facie case, then there is an evidential burden on the part of the respondent to rebut the applicant's case. In Collector of Land Revenue v. Alagappa Chettiar[1968] 1 MLRA 696, [1971] 1 MLJ 43 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council explained the nature of a land reference proceeding before the High Court.

Although upon referring an objection to the High Court for its determination the collector is required to state the grounds on which the amount of compensation was determined, the reference to the High Court is not in the nature of an appeal from the collector's award. It is in the nature of an original hearing in which the applicant is the plaintiff and the collector the defendant.

The onus lies upon the applicant to satisfy the Court by evidence that the amount of compensation awarded is inadequate; the collector is entitled to call evidence in support of the amount awarded.

The same principle was reiterated by Ajaib J in Hoe Guan Investment v. Collector of Land Revenue, Batu Pahat :

In a reference to Court under s. 38(5) of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 it is for the applicant who objects to the award on the ground of inadequancy to show prima facie case that such an award is inadequate and thereupon it is for the collector of Land Revenue to support his award basing on such evidence as he may have to offer.

Encik Tan submitted that since I had rejected the respondent's valuation report, therefore I had no discretion but was bound to accept the applicants' valuation report on its face value. With respect, I cannot accept this proposition for the simple reason that the Practice Direction gives the Counsel for the respondent the right to cross-examine the applicants' valuer on the applicants' valuation report. To my mind, it is consistent with this right as well as with the above decisions to hold the view that, although I had rejected the government valuer's valuation report, that does not mean that the respondent was placed in a hopeless situation. In the instant case, the rejection by the Court of the government valuer's valuation report would be fatal to the respondent only if the Court were to hold that the applicants had succeeded in establishing a prima facie case. And in deciding whether or not there was a prima facie case, the Court was under a duty to examine and evaluate the applicants' valuati