Edgar Joseph Jr J:

Some four weeks ago, upon an opposed ex parte application by summons-in-chambers (Encl. 56) though unsupported by affidavit, by the first and second plaintiffs (the third plaintiff being dead) as occupiers of a plot of land (hereinafter described), I had, on an urgent basis heard argument by Counsel on both sides, and being satisfied that there was a prima facie case of real emergency where time was of the essence, granted an ex parte interim prohibitory injunction to endure until Monday 21 March 1988 at 5.00 p.m. the effect of which was to restrain the first and second defendants who are Perumahan Farlim (Penang) and Sriwata Sdn. Bhd., their servants or agents, as developers and contractors, from entering the said plot. There is plentiful authority supporting such a course of action and I need no more than refer to Re N. (Infants) [1967] Ch 512; P.S. Refson & Co. Ltd. v. Saggers [1984] 1 WLR 1025; Lee v. Department of Education and Science [1967] Atkins' Court Forms Vol. 22 p. 70 (1980 issue); WEA Ltd. v. Visions Channel 4 Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 721 at 724 col. D-F and Allen v. Jambo Holdings Ltd. [1980] 2 All ER 502.

In the event, the first defendant did apply by summons in chambers (Encl. 59) for discharge of the interim injunction. At the same time, there was also before me an application by summons in chambers (Encl. 62) by the plaintiffs, this time, to add Perumahan Farlim (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. and Thean Tatt Construction Sdn. Bhd. as the third and fourth defendants on the ground that it was they and not the first and second defendants who as developers and contractors, were working on the plot at the material time, that is to say, on 18 March 1988, and for an interlocutory injunction directed against them the effect of which was to restrain their entry therein.

And so, at the outset, there being no objection by Mr. Yeoh, Counsel for the defendants, to the application for leave to amend the writ of summons and statement of claim adding the third and fourth defendants, I made an order accordingly.

Consequent upon this, I told Counsel on both sides, that I proposed to substitute the third and fourth defendants for the first and second defendants in the interim injunction but, before I did so, I invited them to submit on the point if they so wished. Mr. Mohideen Abdul Kader, Counsel for the plaintiffs, raised no objection to the proposal. As for Mr. Yeoh, all he said was this: "The third and fourth defendants have complied with the Order", which I took to be an unqualified admission that it was these defendants, their servants or agents, who were working on the plot concerned at the material time.

In these circumstances, I made the substitution aforesaid and discharged the interim injunction insofar as it was directed against the first and second defendants, their servants or agents. Furthermore, I told Counsel I would treat the first defendant's application for the discharge of the interim injunction (Encl. 59) as one for the discharge of the interim injunction directed against the third and fourth defendants, their servants or agents.

There is one other matter which deserves mention before I embark upon a discussion of the issues which arose for decision.

My attention was drawn by Counsel for the plaintiffs to the fact that the interim injunction in the form it then took was limited to only one dwelling house, to wit, No. 426/258K, and the farm on the plot. But, it was said that there was also another dwelling house, to wit, No. 301/259H, on the plot which also required interim protection. So, after listening to argument, I thought it obviously right and fair, to include the other dwelling house in the interim injunction but, of course, without in any way prejudging the issues which I had to determine.

It was on the above basis, that the entire argument on the two cross applications before me proceeded for four full days, namely, 21 and 22 March 1988, and 4 and 5 April 1988 during which period the int