Richard Malanjum JCA:

Introduction

[1] On 12 May 2003 we dismissed with costs the appeal by the appellants against the decision of the High Court in Temerloh on 2 April 2002 refusing to grant an interim injunction as prayed for in encl 12 thereof.

[2] And with the dismissal of the appeal the Erinford Order issued by the same High Court to the appellants on 26 April 2002 was therefore ipso facto set aside.

[3] Dissatisfied with our decision the appellants have now applied for leave to appeal to the Federal Court. We now give our reasons for dismissing the appeal.

Background

[4] The following are not in dispute:

(a) that the respondent is a co-operative society registered under the Co-Operative Societies Act 1993;

(b) that there were three agreements executed by the respondent as the seller with the respective appellants as buyers in connection with the sale of the palm oil mill factory and the estate lands ('the properties');

(c) that all the agreements were dated on 20 November 1998 but was agreed to be effective from 1 January 1998;

(d) that it was pursuant to its corporatization exercise that the respondent executed the agreements with the view of listing with the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange the shares of the companies involved;

(e) that on 26 September 2001 the appellants obtained an ex parteinjunction to restrain the respondent from trespassing onto the properties; such move was taken due to the action of the respondent asserting its ownership and possession of the properties which it maintained were never given to the appellants under the agreements; subsequently, by consent on 15 October 2001 an interim injunction was granted pending the disposal of encl 12;

(f) that the inter partesapplication for injunction (encl 12) was heard and subsequently dismissed on 2 April 2002; the appellants appealed against that dismissal;

(g) that upon the dismissal the appellants and the respondent were at variance with regards to the status of the properties which led the appellants to seek for an Erinford injunction and which was granted on 26 April 2002 pending the disposal of their appeal to this Court. An appeal was also filed by the respondent against the granting of the Erinford injunction.

In The High Court

[5] In dismissing the application of the appellants the learned High Court judge, inter alia, ruled:

(i) that the application involved the exercise of discretion;

(ii) that the balance of convenience tilted in favour of the respondent;

(iii) that damages would be an adequate remedy for the appellants;

(iv) that status quobefore the agreements should be maintained; and

(v) that there was material non-disclosure of relevant facts by the appellant during the ex parte application.

The Appeal

[6] Before us learned counsel for the appellants submitted:

(i) that there are serious issues to be tried such as whether the respondent can take possession of the properties summarily without order of Court and whether the respondent committed the tort of inducement of breach of contract by forbidding employees of the appellants to attend managers' meeting when called;

(ii) that the balance of convenience tilts in favour of the appellants since an injunction will prevent the respondent by way of self-help from dispossessing the appellants and there are also interests of third parties to consider;

(iii) that damages are not adequate in that the injunction sought for is to prevent interference by the respondent of the possession by the appellants of the properties; moreover any interference on their possession would result in irreparable harm to their business and reputation in addition to rights of third parties being affected including their livelihood;

(iv) that there was no material non-disclosure at the ex parte application since the facts referred to by the learned judge was irrelevant to the present causes of action of the appellants;

(v) that the learned judge erred in making finding of facts instead of just identifying them;

(vi) that the learned judge erre