JUDGMENT

Taylor J:

In this case the accused, who is a lorry driver, was charged with house trespass with the intent to intimidate the occupant and also with assault, under s. 352, Penal Code.

The case for the Crown was that the accused went to the complainant's house and protested against the alleged participation of the complainant's son in writing a petition against certain persons, including the accused; after some argument the complainant asked the accused to leave his house but he did not go and threatened to hit the complainant. The accused also made as though to strike another person with a torch but the blow was averted.

Now it should have been clear from the charges and the opening statement of the prosecuting officer that no blood had been shed and that the offence, if any, was not serious. But all concerned, including I fear the learned Magistrate, partly lost their sense of proportion and instead of sticking to essentials and ending the case in an hour or two they allowed it to grow into a local cause celebre, the record of which extends to thirty pages.

I am well aware of the difficulties which attend cases of this kind, of the litigiousness of certain classes and of the desire for thoroughness among conscientious officers. I will therefore try to explain one or two points in the hope that it may be of some help to them. First, they must make themselves thoroughly familiar with those portions of the Procedure and Evidence Codes which are of frequent application in Magistrate's Courts. These are neither lengthy nor hard to pick out; they should be read again and again at intervals until they are so impressed on the mind of the officer that he applies them almost instinctively as the occasion arises. The main points are:

(a) That the trial is summary;

(b) That the evidence must be confined to what is legally relevant;

(c) That where the rule of evidence is explicit it must be enforced strictly, on both sides.

(d) That where the rule is discretionary, e.g. as to points which are remote or only affect credit, the discretion must be exercised with regard to the real gravamen of the charge.

In general what was said is irrelevant and words are almost always less significant than deeds. The witnesses should be told to describe what they saw and did. Even if they cannot tell their tale without repeating accompanying talk much of it can safely be omitted from the record.

It is of the first importance to apply these principles from the start. If the complainant is indulged in chief, it obviously becomes much more difficult to control the cross-examination.

In this case nearly a page of the complainant's evidence-in-chief, (from line 75) could well have been omitted.

If an advocate says something apparently off the point the Magistrate should stop him before the question is interpreted to the witness and ask, e.g. under what provision of law the proposed question falls. He may, of course, try to defeat the Court by taking longer to argue the point than it would take to record the answer. If he does so it is nearly always safe to exclude the question. It is the duty of the advocate to prepare his case with due regard to the real issues and with special care for the law of evidence. If he cannot shew tersely that a proposed question is relevant he cannot complain if the Magistrate promptly excludes it under s. 5 which provides that evidence may be given of legally relevant facts "and of no others". These words are mandatory.

More important even than preventing waste of time, is the fact - illustrated more than once in this case - that discursiveness often lets in something which is definitely inadmissible in law and this may vitiate the whole trial.

I will now try to explain the combined effect of ss. 124 of the Procedure Code and 145 of the Evidence Ordinance regarding police investigation statements.

The basic principle is that the Court is to decide the fact - on the sworn evidence given in Court. What a witnes