JUDGMENT

Raja Azlan Shah J:

This is a motion to set aside an award of the arbitrator dated 27 June 1969 on the ground that the award, when compared with the issues raised in the plaintiffs' points of claim and the respondents' points of defence is bad on the face of it in that the arbitrator was guilty of misconduct, had erred in point of law, gave wrongful inferences of fact and finally that the award was uncertain.

The plaintiffs contracted with the defendants to execute and complete the development of the defendants' land at Sungei Berang, in the State of Perak, in accordance with the specifications, conditions, etc. attached to the contract. The scheme was known as the Sungei Berang Land Development Scheme Phase III and it covered an area of approximately 1,530 acres of jungle land. The work included felling, burning, stacking and reburning, terracing, holding, sowing of cover crops, planting seed-at-stake, maintenance of cultivated areas for six months afterwards and construction of jeep tracks. It was a condition of the contract that the work was to be carried out in accordance with the directions and to the reasonable satisfaction of the superintending officer (DW3). The plaintiffs commenced work in April 1966 but abandoned it before completion.

That was in March 1967. The defendants issued a notice calling upon the plaintiffs to continue work in default they would issue a notice determining the contract. The plaintiffs did not comply with such notice and the defendants duly terminated the contract. The matter went to arbitration before Mr. Khoo Eng Chin, an advocate and solicitor of the High Court. The plaintiffs claimed a sum of $155,949.68 and general damages. Before the arbitrator they specified five items which they alleged the defendants had committed breaches of contract entitling them to abandon the contract before completion, namely:

(1) that the defendants' manager or the superintending officer had persistently and wantonly under-estimated the works done by them and consequently underpaid them in respect of progress payments, (2) that the defendants' manager or the superintending officer had instigated and caused their worker to go on strike on two occasions, (3) that the defendants' manager or the superintending officer had compelled them to purchase rubber seeds at exorbitant prices, (4) that the defendants' manager or the superintending officer had constantly harassed and subjected them to all sorts of pressures, (5) that the defendants had wrongly imposed fines on them under the contract.

The defendants denied the claim and all the allegations made against them and/ or their agents and/or their servants. They contended that the plaintiffs had without reasonable cause wholly suspended and abandoned the contract before completion.

The key question before the arbitrator was whether the plaintiffs were justified in abandoning the contract before completion. In order to decide this question the arbitrator had to consider from the evidence before him whether the five specific allegations enumerated above had been proved. Those were findings of fact. From those findings of fact a question of law became material. The present case bears no resemblance to the case where a specific question of law is referred to the arbitrator.

It is essential to keep the distinction between a case where a dispute is referred to an arbitrator in the decision of which a question of law becomes material from the case in which a specific question of law has been referred to him. The wealth of authorities make a clear distinction between these two classes of cases and they decide that in the former case the Court can interfere if and when any error appears on the face of the award but in the latter case no such interference is possible upon the ground that the decision upon the question of law is an erroneous one. Instances of the former are afforded by Absalom Ltd. v. Great Western (London) Garden Village Society Ltd. [1933] AC 59