JUDGMENT

Suffian LP (delivering the judgment of the Court):

These applications (the first nine by the Public Prosecutor and the last by the accused) were argued successively on Wednesday, 2 May 1979 and on the following day we confirmed the convictions and sentences of each of the accused, except as to application No. 11 in which we made no order and application No. 12 which we dismissed.

Our reasons were as follows.

The accused in all these cases were tried in accordance with the special procedure prescribed by the Essential (Security Cases) Regulations, 1975. and were convicted and sentenced. They appealed to the Federal Court and their appeals were dismissed.

Subsequently it was held by the Privy Council in another case Teh Cheng Poh v. Public Prosecutor that the regulations were ultra vires the constitution and that therefore the trial of the accused in that case was a nullity.

As many similar trials had been held, Parliament at the instance of Government subsequently passed the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act, 1979 (Act 216) - "the Act" - and when Teh Cheng Poh came back from the Privy Council before us to consider whether or not we should order a new trial we held on 27 April 1979 that both the Ordinance (under which the regulations had been promulgated) and the regulations had been validated by Parliament with retrospective effect. That notwithstanding, we ordered a new trial for Teh Cheng Poh for the reasons there stated.

If these accused persons had appealed to the Privy Council, their convictions too would have been quashed and their sentences set aside and the matter referred back to us to consider whether or not to order a new trial. But appeals in criminal matters to the Privy Council were abolished with effect from 1 January 1978 and it was too late for them to appeal further. To dispel public unease, Parliament has made it possible for their cases, notwithstanding that their appeals to this Court have been dismissed, to be reviewed by us, and that is how these applications came before us. The relevant provision of the Act is s. 10 which reads:

Where, before the publication of this Act in the Gazette, any person charged for any offence under the Internal Security Act, 1960, has been tried in accordance with the Essential (Security Cases) Regulations, 1975, and found guilty and convicted and his appeal to the Federal Court has been dismissed, the Public Prosecutor or such person may by notice of motion apply to the Federal Court within 30 days from the date of publication of this Act in the

Gazette, or within such further tune as the Federal Court may allow, to have such case reviewed, and, in such event, the Federal Court shall have jurisdiction to review such case and make such order as it deems fit.

Be it noted that the section uses the word "review" rather than "appeal". Presumably by the use of the word "review" Parliament intends that an independent and impartial judicial body should, in fairness to the accused have power in each case to scrutinize the record of the trial and of the appeal and satisfy itself that the charges were lawful, that the accused was given every opportunity to defend himself with the aid of Counsel and by being given an opportunity to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and to give evidence himself, if he wished, and to call witnesses for the defence; in other words, that there has been a fair trial. And that thereafter there has been a fair appeal on the merits. The avoidance of the use of the word "appeal" would appear to indicate that Parliament does not intend that after the accused's appeal has been dismissed by this Court he should have a second full-scale appeal.

In some of these applications Counsel made attempts to persuade us to assess the weight of the evidence for ourselves in order to determine whether or not the conviction was justified on the evidence. Following the example of the Indian Federal Court in Piare Dusadh v. Emperor [1944] AIR FC 13 this we declin