JUDGMENT

Wan Yahya J:

This matter arose from an originating summons filed by the plaintiff seeking a declaration for the true construction of a lease.

On 4 August 1969 the plaintiff's predecessor in title and father leased to the defendant Holding No. 13 in the Mukim Village of Merlimau in Jasin District together with the premises erected thereon for a fixed period of 59 years with effect from 15 August 1969 and terminating on 14 August 2026. Clause 2 of the Annexure to this lease states that the monthly rental for the premises was $140 per mensem payable in advance on or before the 29 of each calendar month

By cl. 5 the parties stipulated further on the rent as follows:

5. In the event of the assessment being increased by the Government during the unexpired term of the lease the lessee agrees and undertakes to increase the rent payable to the lessor in proportion to the increase of the assessment.

The yearly assessment rate was increased from $86.40 to $129.60 by the District Council with effect from 1 January 1976. The new assessment represented a 50% increase from the old rate.

The plaintiff contends that his monthly rental should be proportionately increased by 50%. The defendant disputes this.

Counsel for the defendant argued that the phrase 'in proportion to the increase of the assessment' merely means the breaking down of the assessment for the year into 12 monthly proportions for the purpose of adding up that amount to the monthly rental. Thus he argued the increase in this case of $43.20, when divided by 12, would give a sum of $3.60. This should be added to the monthly rental of $140 to give a new increased rental of $143.60.

The plaintiff's Counsel, however, felt that the increase in rental should be proportionate to the increase in assessment and the proper calculation of the new rate should be by increasing the old rental in the same proportion by which the assessment has been increased, i.e. by 50%. It follows therefore that an increase by 500f the old rental of $140 would be $70 and the new increased rental will add up to $210.

It was strongly urged by Counsel for the defendant that I should adopt a principle of purposive interpretation in this case and take into consideration what the parties had in mind when they executed the lease. He drew my attention in particular to a passage appearing on p. 16 of the book by Lord Denning entitled "The Discipline of the Law" which ran as follows:

The literal method is now completely out of date. It has been replaced by the approach which Lord Diplock described as the 'purposive approach' ... In all cases now in the interpretation of statutes we adopt such a construction as will 'promote the general legislative purpose' underlying the provision. It is no longer necessary for the Judges to wring their hands and say: 'There is nothing we can do about it'. Whenever the strict interpretation of a statute gives rise to an absurd and unjust situation, the Judges can and should use their good sense to remedy it - by reading words in, if necessary - so as to do what Parliament would have done, had they had the situation in mind.

I am sure Counsel had cited these in the persuasive rather than the authoritative vein, but then these are none the less the words of no lesser personality than Lord Denning himself and therefore merit venerate consideration. Now the judiciousness and sagacity of this passage are indisputable but then with respect I am inclined to feel that it has been somewhat erroneously applied to the present case. The passage to which Counsel referred me falls under the second heading of Pt I dealing with Interpretation of Statutes. In the short passage, as I understand it, the author was discussing the doctrine of purposive approach in Interpretation of statutes as will promote the general legislative purpose. The phrase 'so as to do what Parliament would have done' appearing in the last sentence could only mean that the subject-matter in discussion was the s