JUDGMENT

Hashim Yeop Sani J:

The amended notice of originating motion sought to have the period of 6 weeks limited by O. 69 r. 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court 1980for an application to remit an award under s. 23 of the Arbitration ACt 1952extended on the grounds given in the affidavit of the 1st and 4th applicants. The applicants also sought to remit matters relating to certain payments made and whether the payments were accounted for by the arbitrator.

To get our perspective right let us first examine the relevant provisions of the Arbitration Act 1952.Section 23 of the Act provides that the High Court.Section 24 of the Actinter aliaprovides that the High Court may set aside an award where it is satisfied that an arbitrator has misconducted himself or that the award has been improperly procured. Order 69 r. 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court 1980provides that an application to remit an award under s. 23 of the Arbitration Actmay be made within 6 weeks after the award has been made and published.

The award concerned was made on 2 April 1981 - Exhibit P10 attached to the affidavit of the applicants. The originating motion was first taken out on 16 September 1981 and subsequently amended on 12 October 1981. In other words, the application for extension of time in this case was made 5½ months after the award was made and 4 months after expiry of the period required by O. 69 r. 4 of the rules of the High Court 1980.

In the present application the applicants would have to satisfy the Court firstly that there were good grounds for the delay in making the application and secondly, there was sufficient merit for the award to be remitted to the arbitrator.

The reasons given in the affidavit of the applicants were that there was a divergence of opinion on, or interpretation of the award between the parties and this divergence or difference was according to the applicants first realised only on 23 June 1981 - see para. 27 of the affidavit dated 16 September 1981. Only after this realisation did the applicants feel that there was "genuine doubt" in their minds whether the various amounts paid by them as described in para. 15 of the affidavit had been taken into account by the arbitrator in his award. In my opinion it is in paras. 27 and 29 of the affidavit of the applicants that the real crux of the question in this case lies. For it is in these two paragraphs that the following propositions were crystallised:

(i) That the applicants realised for the first time on 23 June 1981 that their interpretation of the award was different from that of the respondent; and

(ii) The real ground behind their application for remitting the award was that they felt there was genuine doubt in their minds whether the various amounts referred to by them in para. 15 of the affidavit had been taken into account by the arbitrator.

It is to be noted, however, that the applicants had in another proceeding in OM A35 of 1981 in their affidavit in reply to the application of the respondent for leave to enforce the same award raised (in para. 5 of their affidavit dated 2 July 1981) the same point about certain payments probably not accounted for by the arbitrator. It may be pointed out that in the same affidavit in OM A35 of 1981 the applicants did not, however, ask that the award be remitted but merely requested clarification from the arbitrator before the award could be enforced.

It is also to be noted that in the affidavit of the applicants in OM A31 of 1981 and their affidavit in OM A35 of 1981 all the payments referred to were made on various dates in 1979 and 1980. In other words, these payments were all made before the date of the award i.e. 2 April 1981 although some payments were made after the statement of claim was filed. It is not disputed that the award itself was made and published on 2 April 1981. It is also admitted by the applicants in their affidavit that they knew of "the different interpretation" on 23 June 1981. In another affidavit sworn on