JUDGMENT

Wan Yahya J:

On 14 June 1980, the appellant was charged before the President of the Sessions Court, Melaka, for an offence under s. 4(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1961. At all times he was represented by his Counsel, Mr. Manjeet Singh Dhillon. The charge was read over and explained to the appellant in the presence of his Counsel and he pleaded guilty to the charge. In accordance with the accepted practice in our Courts, the Deputy Public Prosecutor Encik Ghazali, who appeared for the prosecution, outlined the fact of the case against the appellant. The appellant freely admitted these facts to be true. The learned President, having by then satisfied himself that the appellant understood the charge against him and the nature and consequences of his plea, accepted the obviously unequivocal plea of the appellant and recorded a conviction against him. The defence Counsel then delivered his plea in mitigation on behalf of the appellant and requested the Court to impose a non-custodial sentence. In reply the Deputy Public Prosecutor prayed, as they invariably did, for a deterrent sentence. Whereupon the learned Counsel for the defence, angrily interposed to say that, as the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor had agreed earlier that he would be leaving the matter of sentence to the Court, he had indicated this to his client. He expressed disgust at the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor's behaviour and asked the Court not to accept the plea. That was the expression used by the defence Counsel, as recorded by the PSC, but not by the newspaper reports on which the defence Counsel was relying to discredit the accuracy of the President's records. According to the paper cuttings placed before this Court, Counsel also said some other unkind things about the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor, which, for the purpose of this appeal, I shall ignore. In the two newspaper cuttings from the New SundayTimesdated 15 June 1980 and the Sunday Starof the same date, Counsel appears to have said a little more both to his credit and discredit. In the SundayStarcutting he is reported to have said that his client "had been led into believing that the Deputy Public Prosecutor would not be pressing for deterrent sentence and that the Court would be persuaded into giving a lenient sentence". The New Sunday Timesmade no mention about his client being "misled" but both papers refer to the Counsel's dissatisfaction to the request for deterrent sentence by the Deputy Public Prosecutor. The New Sunday Timesalso contained a paragraph in which Counsel said "he would not allow his client to plead guilty because of the breach".

Now, not only are the newspaper reports at variance on some aspects of the case, but they also differ from the notes of evidence on the subject of this so-called pre-trial understanding reached between the Deputy Public Prosecutor and Counsel, where it was recorded that the understanding was `to leave the matter of sentence to the Court' and `sentence is a matter for the Court to decide.'

Newspaper reports of Court cases are, by no means, absolutely accurate verbatimreports of what actually transpired in the Court room. Prolific writers of the press, eager to ensure more exciting and wide spread public reading of their articles, at times resort to the use of different expressions from those actually used in Court so as to stimulate the normally dull Court case into a more intriguing and emotional story. I mean no offence to the press, indeed I feel there is nothing to prevent them from doing so, within limits that is, as their reports are intended for use by different readers and certainly not by the appellate Court or as summing up to the jury. Counsel should realise that it will require more than newspaper cuttings to discredit the written words of a trial President. A trial Judge is not required to transcribe every word spoken by Counsel in Court. It would suffice if he recorded the substance of that argument.

This protracted qu