Abdoolcader J

(delivering the judgment of the Court): The short but pivotal point raised for determination in this appeal relates to the capacity of the respondent to institute and maintain the proceedings instituted by him in this matter. This involves the question of his locus standi or standing to sue, scilicet, whether the instigator of an action has the right to bring the mechanism of the court into operation. The Basic Facts

The respondent (and the court has been constantly reminded in these proceedings of his vocation as a fisherman though what his piscatorial pursuit has got to do with his standing to sue is beyond us) and 183 other persons applied in May, 1972 for State land in Sekakap, Mersing in the State of Johore but with no response for some 8 years. It then came to his knowledge, and this is borne out by an official search, that some time in 1976 land in that area had in fact been alienated to more than 100 people, the majority of whom are not resident in Mersing, including the appellant who was at all material times the Menteri Besar of the State of Johore and personages in the upper echelon of the administration such as members of the State Executive Council and Ministers.

The respondent on December 23, 1980 instituted these proceedings seeking declarations basically impugning the validity of the alienation of land in Mersing to the appellant and named as respondents thereto the State Director of Lands and Mines and the Government of the State of Johore in addition to the appellant. The appellant applied on March 17, 1981 to have the proceedings instituted struck out primarily on a challenge to the respondent's standing to sue and also on certain procedural objections. The appellant's application was dismissed in the High Court on September 20, 1981 and the appeal a quo has been presented before us only on the issue of the respondent's locus standi. The Question of The Respondent's Standing

It will be necessary at the outset to consider the scope of the power to grant declaratory orders and judgments. Chapter VI of the Specific Relief Act, 1950 deals with declaratory decrees and section 41 thereof provides for the discretion of the court as to declarations of status or right. Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act was textually adopted totidem verbis from section 42 of the Indian Specific Relief Act, 1877 (now section 34 of the Indian Specific Relief Act, 1963), and on an application of the law enunciated by the Privy Council and the Supreme Court of India in relation to the equivalent provisions in the Indian Specific Relief Act and Civil Procedure Code, section 41 of the Specific Relief Act gives statutory recognition to a well-recognised type of declaratory relief and subjects it to a limitation but it cannot be deemed to exhaust every kind of declaratory relief or to circumscribe the jurisdiction of the courts to give declarations of right in appropriate cases falling outside it. The court has power to grant such a decree independently of the requirements of the section, and such a declaration outside the purview of this statutory enactment will be governed by the general provisions of Order 15 rule 16 of the Rules of the High Court, 1980 which will then apply [ Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd v His Highness Maharaja Sir Brijnath Singhji Deo of Maihar & Ors AIR 1975 SC 1810, following Vemareddi Ramaraghava Reddy & Ors v Konduru Seshu Reddy & Ors AIR 1967 SC 436 relying on the decisions of the Privy Council in Fisher v Secretary of State for India in Council (1899) 26 IA 16 and Partab Singh v Bhabuti Singh (1913) 40 IA 182].

Although counsel for the respondent indicated in the court below that he is proceeding under section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, this statutory provision cannot apply as no entitlement of the respondent to any legal character or status or right to property or denial thereof is in issue, and he now accepts in answer to us that the declarations are in fact sought under the provisions