JUDGMENT

Edgar Joseph Jr J:

It has been said that applications for Mareva injunctions are invariably made ex parte in the first instance because in a genuine Mareva case the defendant ex hypothesi is likely to hasten the removal of his assets once he becomes aware of any application preventing him from doing so. "The whole point of the Mareva jurisdiction," said Mustill J in the Third Chandris Shipping Corporation v. Unimarine S.A. [1979] QB 645, 653, "is that the plaintiff proceeds by stealth, so as to pre-empt any action by the defendant to remove his assets from the jurisdiction." In the same way the Court of Appeal in Mediterranea Raffineria Siciliana Petroli S.p.a. v. Mabanaft GmbH Unreported [1978] noted by Charity, loc. cit. 356, emphasized the need to "see the stable door is locked before the horse is gone." For this reason, in altogether exceptional and in extreme circumstances, a Judge can entertain a telephonic request by Counsel for a Mareva injunction and, if the matter is satisfactorily explained, make an order accordingly; see, for example, Allen v. Jumbo Holdings Ltd. [1980] 1 WLR 1252, 1254, 1255. In this case, however, the application was made inter partes because it was a sequel to a successful application by the defendants to discharge an ex parte order which I had earlier made under s. 19 of the Debtors Act 1957. In making the order for discharge I merely announced my decision without giving any reasons but I should now wish to make it clear that I did so because I was satisfied on the additional material and the arguments at the inter partes hearing that there was insufficient evidence from which I could draw the inference of an intent to obstruct or delay on the part of the defendants within the meaning of s. 19 of the Debtors Act. I did however add a rider that it was open to the plaintiffs, should they so wish, to apply for a Mareva injunction, in which case it would be determined on its merits and after hearing submissions by Counsel on both sides.

In my view, however, the mere fact that an ex parte order under s. 19 has been discharged upon application by the defendant does not ipso facto mean that an application for a Mareva injunction by the same plaintiff on the same grounds is bound to fail because, amongst other considerations, the points requiring proof for a Mareva injunction are less demanding than those required for a s. 19 order as I shall presently demonstrate and, in doing so, I propose also to deal generally with some of the more obvious differences between these two remedies.

In the first place, s. 19 applications have to comply with strict statutory requirements laid down therein whereas, Mareva jurisdiction rests with the Courts' general discretion and is not circumscribed by statutory requirements.

In the second place, a writ must be issued before an application supported by evidence on oath can be made under s. 19 whereas, in urgent cases, Mareva jurisdiction can be invoked before issue of the writ and, if the situation demands it, on the strength of a draft affidavit with an undertaking to affirm one later: Chartered Bank v. Daklouche [1980] 1 WLR 107; Allen v. Jumbo Holdings Ltd. [1980] 1 WLR 1252 and Z. Ltd. v. A. [1982] 1 All ER 556 . It follows, that Mareva orders can be obtained more speedily than s. 19 orders.

In the third place, the plaintiff in a s. 19 application must satisfy the Court that he has a good cause of action, whereas, in Mareva applications, all he need do is to show that he has a good arguable case (the Pertamina [1977] 3 All ER 324, 334). It follows, that the standard of proof required for Mareva orders is lower than that required for s. 19 orders.

In the fourth place, in s. 19 applications, in addition to showing that he has a good cause of action, the applicant would be entitled to an order in his favour if he can also satisfy the Court that the defendant is absent from the Federation and his place of abode cannot be discovered or service of the writ of su