Mohamed Dzaiddin J

This creditor's petition for a Receiving Order came up before me on November 23, 1984. A Notice of Intention to Oppose the petition was filed on September 25, 1984. On November 24, 1984 I heard submissions of counsel. Although six grounds were given for opposing the petition, Mr. Subash Chandran, counsel for the debtor merely challenged the validity of this Bankruptcy Notice issued on October 20, 1983 and the act of bankruptcy relied on by the judgment creditors in the petition. In the final analysis, he has asked that this petition be dismissed or stayed on the ground that an appeal is pending against the summary judgment of the learned Registrar in Civil Suit No. 276 of 1981. The Bankruptcy Notice issued was in respect of this judgment sum and the act of bankruptcy relied upon by the judgment creditor was his failure to comply with the requirement of the Bankruptcy Notice.

On the question of the validity of the Bankruptcy Notice issued on October 20, 1983, I have held that the said Bankruptcy Notice was properly issued. In this respect, I referred counsel to my judgment in Re: Robert Chuah Koh Hoay ex parte: Hwang & Yusoff Securities Sdn Bhd (Bankruptcy No 205 of 1983 Judgment of Mohamed Dzaiddin J) where a similar point was argued. I held the view that the Court had a discretion to allow an extension of time to serve the Bankruptcy Notice even though such application was made after the expiration of one month from the issue thereof.

On the second issue, Mr. Subash Chandran has urged me to exercise my discretion to grant a stay of this Bankruptcy Petition until an appeal against the order of the learned Registrar is completed. Section 6(4) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967 provides that where the act of bankruptcy relied on is non-compliance with the Bankruptcy Notice to pay, secure or compound for a judgment debt, the court may if it thinks fit stay or dismiss the petiton on the ground that an appeal is pending from the judgment. It is clear that this court has a discretion whether to stay the proceedings or not, but the debtor cannot claim a stay as a right. Where the court in the exercise of its discretion refuses to stay the proceedings, its decision will be upheld, unless it is clear that the discretion was wrongly exercised ( Re: French, ex parte French (1889) 6 Mor 258; 24 QBD 63 CA).

It has been held that the court in exercising its discretion whether to grant or refuse the stay of proceedings could have regard to all the circumstances of the case ( In re: Noble (A Bankrupt) [1965] 1 Ch 129. In the present case the summary judgment against the debtor was granted by the Registrar on September 22, 1982. Immediately after the judgment the debtor filed an appeal to the Judge in Chambers which said appeal came up for hearing on December 6, 1982. As neither the debtor nor his counsel appeared before the Judge, it was then ordered that no appeal would be entertained until and unless costs thrown away was paid by the debtor to the judgment creditor's solicitors. On December 7, 1982, the judgment creditor's solicitors wrote to the debtor's solicitors informing them that the Judge had ordered the debtor to pay costs thrown away and had ruled that no appeal was to be heard if costs were not paid first. They had also asked for the cheque for the sum of $120 being costs thrown away. In addition, they requested the debtor's solicitors to return the draft order and judgment duly approved. On December 16, 1982, the judgment creditor's solicitors wrote to the Registrar, High Court, informing him that the draft judgment was sent to the debtor's solicitors on September 23, 1982 with the reminder sent on December 7, 1982. However, since then no reply had been received from the debtor's solicitors. In the circumstances, they enclosed a fresh order and judgment for the Registrar's approval. On January 15, 1983 the Registrar wrote to the debtor's solicitors informing them that the appeal would not be fixed for hearing until the