JUDGMENT

Edgar Joseph Jr J:

These were two applications to strike out a writ of summons and statement of claim pursuant to O. 18 r. 19, of the Rules of the High Court 1980, as disclosing no reasonable cause of action, as being scandalous, frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of the Court and, alternatively, for dissolution of certain ex parte interlocutory injunctions.

The applications arose out of a suit by the plaintiff, a registered trade union, established in 1963, whose objects were and are to secure the organisation and promotion of the welfare of workers employed in companies manufacturing non-metallic mineral products including structural clay products. The plaintiff cited four defendants in the suit; being, the Director General of Trade Unions, the first defendant, Franklin Porcelain Sdn. Berhad and Franklin Mint Porcelain Manufacturing Sdn. Bhd., the second and the third defendants, respectively, who have two factories at Kulim Industrial Estate, Kulim Kedah, are said to employ more than 3000 workers and produce porcelain ceramic products, and Kesatuan Pekerja-pekerja Kumpulan Syarikat Franklin Porcelain, the fourth defendant, an inhouse union.

It was said that the factory of the third defendant came into operation sometime in early 1989 and some of the processes carried out by the second defendant were transferred to the third defendant.

For the sake of brevity and convenience, unless the context otherwise requires, all references herein to sections are to the Industrial Relations Act 1967 (`the Act').

On 7 March 1988, the plaintiff, pursuant to s. 9(2) of the Act served a claim for recognition on the second defendant who addressed an objection to the first defendant on the ground of lack of competence, but the former, after investigating the matter, made a ruling contained in a letter dated 9 June 1988 that the plaintiff was competent to organise and represent the workers in the second defendant's factory other than those in certain excluded categories. But the plaintiff also contends that it is competent to represent the workers employed by the third defendant.

Be that as it may, the second defendant by a letter dated 17 June 1988 had appealed to the Minister for Labour (`the Minister') against the ruling of the first defendant aforesaid.

However, it was further said that when the first defendant carried out a membership check it was discovered that the membership forms were not signed by the members themselves, so the plaintiff withdrew its claim for recognition addressed to the second defendant on the advice of the first defendant.

But, by a letter dated 7 July 1988, the plaintiff complained to the Jabatan Perhubungan Perusahaan that the second defendant was trying to influence or instigate the union members in the factory to resign from the plaintiff union, whereupon, that body decided to act on the complaint.

The next event of significance, according to the plaintiff, occurred on 20 March 1989, when about 2000 workers from the factory staged a walkout because they were dissatisfied with, amongst other grievances, the low wages and forced overtime.

Then, by a letter dated 3 April 1989, the plaintiff informed the first defendant that they were in the process of receiving applications from the workers in the second defendant's factory to become members of the plaintiff union.

Next, by a letter dated 4 May 1989, the plaintiff submitted a claim for recognition to the second and the third defendants but they had by letter dated 23 May 1989 declined to do so.

On 17 May 1989, the plaintiff claimed that whilst it was in the process of organising the workers in the factory and awaiting a reply from the second and the third defendants on its claim for recognition, the first defendant registered the fourth defendant - an in-house union - as a trade union under the Trade Unions Act 1959.

On 18 May 1989, the fourth defendant served on the second and the third defendants claims for recognition and, on the next d