Lai Kew Chai J

By this criminal motion, the applicant applied for an order that Income Tax Summons Case Nos 90142 to 90147 of 1988 be transferred from the subordinate courts and heard in the High Court pursuant to s 185 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Ed). At the conclusion of the hearing of the criminal motion, I held that the application did not, in my judgment, come within s 185(1)(a), (b) or (e) of the CPC and accordingly dismissed it. I indicated that I would give my reasons later. This I now do.

For present purposes, the relevant statutory provisions in the CPC which require recital are as follows:

185(1) Whenever it is made to appear to the High Court that --

(a) a fair and impartial inquiry ... trial cannot be had in any criminal court subordinate to it;

(b) some question of law of unusual difficulty is likely to arise; or

...

(e) such an order is expedient for the ends of justice ... ,

it may order that --

...

(ii) any particular criminal case shall be transferred to and tried before the High Court.

The appellant was charged with four counts of evasion of income tax under s 96(1)(a) and two counts under s 96(1)(d) of the Income Tax Act (Cap 134, 1985 Ed). The relevant income tax summonses were due to be heard on 5 December 1988 to 23 December 1988 in Court No 10 of the subordinate courts. In support of the criminal motion, the applicant filed an affidavit which contained 40 paragraphs. As I was satisfied that it contained irrelevant and scandalous matters, pursuant to O 41 r 6 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1970, I ordered that except for eight paragraphs the other paragraphs of the affidavit be expunged.

The first contention of the applicant was that there were questions of law of unusual difficulty to be tried in this case, within the meaning of s 185(1)(b) of the CPC. However, an analysis of the charges would disclose that the only two issues before the trial courts would be whether the applicant had omitted to declare certain earned income in his income tax returns and, if he did, whether the omission was wilful. It is beyond dispute that district judges are perfectly competent to try the sort of cases with which the appellant was concerned: see Measor & Anor v PP [1972] 1 MLJ 195.

The applicant's second contention was based on his status as a non-constituency Member of Parliament and as a professional person. In the penultimate paragraph of his affidavit the applicant asserted that 'previous prosecutions of political figures in the subordinate courts and their erroneous convictions led to disquiet and allegations of executive interference in the subordinate courts judiciary'. He then concluded in these terms: 'In order to avoid further allegations from being made, it is my firm belief that the said matters be heard by a High Court. Further, bearing in mind the grave consequences to me as an NCMP and professional person in addition to the possibility of a custodial sentence I believe this case involves matters of public interest.' It appeared to me that it was fashionable to make scurrilous allegations of this kind. The law must take its course. The real question was whether this court would fairly and legitimately treat politicians who were charged differently from accused persons who were not politicians. As was held by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Wong Hong Toy & Anor v PP [1986] 2 MLJ 336 at p 339: 'It is beyond question that all accused persons should be treated equally regardless of status.'

The final ground of the applicant as contained in para 40 of the applicant's affidavit was that if he was tried in the High Court and convicted he would have a further recourse to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. This ground was rejected by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Wong Hong Toy & Anor v PP [1986] 2 MLJ 336 for the reasons they gave and I need not repeat them in this judgment.

The criminal motion was accordingly dismissed.