JUDGMENT

Chong Siew Fai CJ (Sabah & Sarawak):

This appeal concerns a claim by the 1st plaintiff/appellant in the High Court in Johor Bahru for damages arising out of a collision between his car driven by his driver, the 2nd plaintiff, in which he was a passenger and a lorry belonging to the 1st defendant/respondent and driven by the 2nd defendant/ respondent, the servant and/or agent of the 1st defendant. The appellant claimed for general and special damages totaling over RM4 million. After a full trial of the action, the learned trial Judge found the respondents solely liable but awarded the appellant only RM9,200 for special damages and RM53,200 for general damages totaling RM62,400. Against the decision the appellant appeals. The judgment was handed down on 26 February 1994 and notice of appeal was filed on 19 March 1994.

At the commencement of the appeal, Counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary objection on the propriety of the appeal contending that since the amount awarded was less than RM100,000 the appellant must first obtain leave under s. 68(1)(a) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 ('the Act') before bringing this appeal, which the appellant did not.

Section 68(1)(a) of the Act applicable at the material time read:

No appeal shall be brought to the Supreme Court in any of the following cases:

(a) when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the claim (exclusive of interest) is less than one hundred thousand ringgit, except with the leave of the Supreme Court or a Judge of the High Court; (emphasis added).

For the respondents, learned Counsel pointed out that the judgment sum RM62,400 (excluding interest) obtained on 26 February 1994 was less than RM100,000. He argued that since it was an accident claim, the amount or value of the subject matter of the claim crystallized in the judgment and that in determining whether leave was necessary, the Court vested with the jurisdiction to grant leave must consider the value of the judgment, citing the following passage of the judgment of Hashim Yeop A. Sani CJ in Yap Fook Cheong & Anor. v. Burkill (Malaya) Sdn. Bhd. & Anor. [1991] 3 MLJ 160@ 163 in support:

The operative words in s. 68(1)(a) are the amount or value of the subject matter of the claim'. The words 'at the trial' which appeared in s. 68(1)(a) before the amendment in 1987 have been left out which restricted the scope to the amount or value of the subject matter at the trial. The present s. 68(1)(a) is wider in scope and covers winding-up matters as in this case where the judgment debt which had brought the winding-up order is less than RM100,000. The term 'subject matter' was dealt with in Studham v. Stanbridge which was an interpleader proceeding.

Cave J said:

The point raised is as to the meaning of O. LA r. 12 of the County Court Rules 1889 he higher scale of costs in force in the county Court is threefold. Column A applies to cases where the subject-matter or the sum recovered exceeds 10243 and does not exceed 20243 and Col B where it exceeds 20243 and does not exceed 501, and Col C where it exceeds 50243. The question here is whether the claimant's costs come under Col C, as the learned county Court Judge has decided, or whether they do not. Rule 12 provides that in interpleader proceedings the 'subject-matter' shall mean in the case of a claimant (which is this case) 'the amount of the value of the goods his claim to which is allowed, plus the amount of the damage

(if any) adjudged'. Now, here the county Court Judge has found that the amount of the value of the goods the claim to which was allowed was 51243 and he has adjudged 10243 damages.

Column C therefore applies because the subject-matter exceeds 50243.

Then came the following conclusion of the learned Chief Justice upon which the respondents heavily relied:

It is clear therefore the Court does not merely look at the relief sought but also considers the value of the judgment if it can be ascertained.

Learned Counsel for the