JUDGMENT

Gopal Sri Ram JCA:

The appellant before us (plaintiff in the court below) was the registered proprietor of approximately 996 hectares of land situated in the State of Johor. It filed proceedings in the High Court of Johor challenging the decision by the first defendant (the State Government of Johor) to acquire the land, which I will, for convenience, refer to as "the subject property". This forms the subject matter of the Civil Appeal No. J-01-30-96 ("the first appeal"). There is another appeal before us arising out of the same subject matter. It is Civil Appeal J-02-68-96 ("the second appeal"). I will say something more of the second appeal in a moment.

Returning to the facts of the case, the plaintiff in its statement of claim, apart from joining the Government of Johor and the Land Administrator, cited Prolink Sdn. Bhd. as the third defendant. The gist of the appellant's complaint is that the subject property was acquired contrary to law in the sense that the acquisition was ultra vires or vitiated on "Anisminic" grounds (the reference here being to the decision of the House of Lords in Anisminic Ltd v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147) or for "Wednesbury unreasonableness" (see Associated Provincial Pictures House Ltd v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223). After service of the writ and statement of claim on all defendants, applications were taken out by the first and second respondents in the first appeal as well as Prolink (respondent in the second appeal) to strike out the action on the ground that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The learned judge who heard both sets of applications granted them and struck out the plaintiff's statement of claim. The appellant has now filed two appeals and as I have said in the first appeal, it is the Johor Government and Land Administrator who are the respondents.

I now turn to the second appeal merely to state that the respondent is Prolink and that the challenge by the appellant is limited to the order made in the separate summons in that case.

For convenience we heard both the appeals together and I propose to give reasons for my decision in both appeals at the same time.

The application to strike out in the first appeal was based on O. 18 r. 19(1)(a) of the Rules of the High Court 1980. In the second appeal, affidavits were also filed but as events transpired they were not used. Counsel before us have therefore proceeded on the ground that both appeals are grounded and are to be treated as having been made under O. 18 r. 19(1)(a).

The principles governing an application made under O. 18 r. 19(1)(a) are well settled and have been stated by our courts on many occasions. For my part I can do no better than to quote from the judgment of Raja Azlan Shah J (as he then was) in Mooney & Ors v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co & Anor [1967] 1 MLJ 87 at p. 88:

It is firmly established that the power exercised under r. 4 (the precursor to O. 18 r. 19) 'is only appropriate in cases which are plain and obvious so that a judge can say at once that a statement of claim as it stands is sufficient, even if proved, to entitle the plaintiff to the relief of which he asks for': see the judgment of Lindley M.R. in Hubbuck & Sons v. Wilkinsons, Heywood & Clark Ltd. [1899] 1 QB 86, 91. Where the situation arises, the pleadings and particulars alone shall be considered and all the allegations in it shall be presumed to be true, and it is only on that assumption that any suitable case can be made for this application: see Peck v. Russell [1923] 4 FMSLR 32, 34. The court cannot and indeed is not empowered to look behind the pleadings and particulars if it discloses a reasonable cause of action.

So long as the statement of claim discloses some ground of action the mere fact that the plaintiff is not likely to succeed on it at the trial is no ground for it to be struck out: see Boaler v. Holder [1886] 54 LT 298. A recent exposition of the law is afforded by the judgm