Gopal Sri Ram JCA:

(1) (delivering judgment of the court):

(2) 1 This is the judgment of the court.

(3) 2 The Co-Operative Central Bank Ltd (‘CCB’) is not a bank at all. It is a co-operative society registered and governed by the provisions of the Co-Operative Societies Act 1948. We are advised by counsel that it is still in existence. In 1987, CCB got into financial difficulties. According to the affidavit evidence placed before us at p 689 of the record of appeal in Appeal No W–02–567 of 1999, the excess of liabilities over assets amounted to almost RM650m. It was hopelessly insolvent. It had taken deposits from members of the public. There was a grave danger that innocent depositors would lose their monies. So the government acted.

(4) 3 It got Bank Negara Malaysia (‘BNM’) to move under the Essential (Protection of Depositors) Regulations 1986. On 7 January 1988, BNM exercised powers under those regulations and appointed two persons to assume control and carry on the business of CCB. On 7 March 1989, BNM applied to the High Court in Kuala Lumpur and obtained the appointment of Tuan Haji Zainal Abidin Putih and Tuan Haji Ahmad Kamal bin Abdullah Al-Yafii as the receivers of CCB (‘the receivers’).

(5) 4 After the receivers took over the conduct of CCB’s businesses, they proceeded to terminate the services of all CCB’s employees. This includes the 116 respondents in these 4 appeals before us.

(6) 5 Later, on 2 September 1993 on the application of BNM, the receivers were discharged and two persons were appointed to administer the affairs of CCB (‘the appointees’). Subsequently, on 10 October 1994 some of the assets and liabilities of CCB were sold and transferred to PhileoAllied Bank.

(7) 6 The respondents, after the termination of their services, set in motion the procedure under s 20 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 (‘the Act’). Eventually, their dispute with CCB was referred to the Industrial Court by the Honourable Minister. When the dispute reached the Industrial Court, the respondents applied to join the receivers as parties. The Industrial Court acceded to this request. The receivers then moved the High Court for an order of certiorari. Abu Mansor J (as he then was) acceded to that application. He quashed the decision of the Industrial Court. The respondents appealed to the Supreme Court. The main contention was that no leave was required to add parties to the proceedings. The Supreme Court set aside Abu Mansor J’s decision. It restored the order of the Industrial Court and remitted the matter to that court.

(8) 7 When the proceedings re-commenced in the Industrial Court, an application was made to have the receivers removed as parties. This is because the order discharging the receivers had already been made. The learned chairman after hearing arguments reserved his decision. Some one year and four months later, he delivered his interim award and held that the receivers were no longer necessary parties and ordered them to be struck out by exercising the powers conferred on him under s 29(a) of the Act. The respondents were unhappy with that interim award. They took it before the learned judge of the High Court on an application for certiorari. They applied for leave and got it.

(9) 8 Later, on 21 March 1997, the respondents took out a summons in chambers to amend the substantive motion and to adduce further evidence by way of affidavit. When the substantive motion came on for hearing, CCB and the receivers took the point that there had been a suppression of material facts and argued that the leave should be revoked by the court. The learned judge refused that application. CCB and the receivers then appealed against that decision. It forms the subject matter of the first of the four appeals before us.

(10) 9 In the course of hearing the respondents’ substantive motion, the learned judge, on 30 June 1997, made an order on the respondents’ summons dated 25 March 1997. By that order, the