JUDGMENT

Gopal Sri Ram JCA:

There are two appeals before us. They raise common questions of trite law. They were therefore heard together. At the conclusion of arguments on 5 April 2001, we reserved judgment. The facts that form the core of these appeals may be shortly stated.

The respondent in each of these appeals was at all material times employed by the appellant. At the time they commenced their employment with the appellant, their respective contracts of service did not specify the age at which they would have to retire. It was only much later; several years after the employment had commenced; that the appellant informed the respondents that they would have to retire at the age of 55 years. Eventually the respondents were asked to retire. They took the position that it was not open to the appellant to retire them at 55 years of age. They said that they ought to be permitted to work until they attained 60 years of age. Their cases were referred to the Industrial Court which held for the appellant. The respondents then applied to the High Court for certiorari. The learned judge who heard the application granted it. He quashed the award. He held that the respondents had been dismissed without just cause or excuse. He then proceeded to award the respondents compensation for the period between the date of dismissal and the date on which each respondent would attain the age of 60 years. The appellant has appealed against that order.

The main, indeed, the only point in this case is whether the learned judge transgressed the clear line between his review jurisdiction and his appellate power. It is a point that is covered by much authority. I need only discuss it briefly.

The power of the High Court to exercise judicial review is confined to questions of law. It has no jurisdiction in certiorariproceedings to interfere with questions of fact arrived at by the Industrial Court. We have said so on numerous occasions. Whether the High Court has crossed the line in a given case depends on the facts of that case and on the approach adopted by the judge therein.

In Quah Swee Khoon v. Sime Darby Bhd[2001] 1 CLJ 9, 23, this court after a review of the authorities said:

Our response to counsel is that each case depends upon its own facts for the appropriate legal result. It is to be noted that neither Amanah Butlernor Swedish Motor Assemblieswere cases that turned upon credibility of evidence. Such findings are in our judgement immunized from judicial review: William Jacks & Co (M) Sdn Bhd v. S Balasingam[1997] 3 CLJ 235. Whether a High Court has exercised appellate functions depends upon the approach taken in a particular case. If a judge to whom application is made for certiorariinquires into and disturbs findings of fact based on the credibility of witnesses, he does indeed exercise appellate functions. It is important to remember that in judicial review proceedings the High Court must accept as gospel findings of fact made by the Industrial Court based on credibility of witnesses. As was observed by Mohd Azmi FCJ in Wong Yuen Hock v. Syarikat Hong Leong Assurance Sdn Bhd and another appeal[1995] 3 CLJ 344 at p 348:

In exercising judicial review, the High Court was obliged not to interfere with the findings of the Industrial Court unless they were found to be unreasonable, in the sense that no reasonable man or body of men could reasonably come to the conclusion that it did, or that the decisions of the Industrial Court looked at objectively, were so devoid of any plausible justification that no reasonable person or body of persons could have reached them (see Lord Denning's judgment in Griffiths (Inspector of Taxes) v. JP Harrison (Watford) Ltd[1962] 1 All ER 909 at p 916, and judgment of Lord Diplock in Bromley London Borough Council v. Greater London Council & Anor[1983] 1 AC 768 at p 821; [1982] 1 All ER 153 at p 159; [1982] 2 WLR 92 at p 100).

It is the ultimate decision of the Industrial Court when looked as a whole that matters.