JUDGMENT

Vincent Ng J:

Before me is an appeal by the appellant (the plaintiff in the court below) lodged pursuant to O. 49 r. 2(2) of the Subordinate Courts Rules 1980, against the decision of the learned Sessions Court judge on 3 March 2000 allowing the respondent to be made a party to the proceedings as an intervener.

This is a runner case, and those involved in the alleged accident are the respective parties in this case, wherein summons was filed on 22 January 1997 and the trial commenced on 24 September 1997. As usual in a runner case, a defendant is represented by counsel appointed by the insurance company. In the current case the defendant's counsel was an appointee of Kurnia Insurans (M) Berhad (Kurnia). During the trial, counsel for the defendant reported to the insurers that he suspected that the accident never occurred. Kurnia then conducted their own investigations and on 10 January 1998, lodged a police report alleging fraud. The hearing of the plaintiff's case, which began on 24 September 1997, was continued on 17 February 1998, 6 March 1998, 8 June 1998, 29 September 1998 and closed on 9 November 1998. Then, on 14 November 1999 the defendant opened his case and his evidence on the accident was led and completed in examination-in-chief. Although the police report was lodged on 10 January 1998, it was only on 20 February 1999 that Kurnia filed an application to be made a party - as interveners in the case.

The learned Sessions Court judge allowed Kurnia's application which led to this appeal. The appellant, who was the plaintiff in the Sessions Court proceedings, raised several issues in support of his appeal. However, after reading the written submissions and hearing counsel for Kurnia and the plaintiff, I am of the view that there are, in the main, only four issues for my determination. The issues are: firstly, whether the respondent in particular (and other road vehicle insurers generally) could in law, considering the provisions of s. 96(1) of the Road Transport Act 1987(the Act), be made a party to the running down proceedings; secondly, whether there has been an inordinate delay on the part of the respondent in filing the application to be added as a party ('intervener') in the proceedings, and if the delay is inordinate, the effect thereof; thirdly, whether such applications, if at all tenable in law, ought to be framed as a prayer that the intervener be added as a co-defendant rather than as intervener; and lastly, whether particulars of fraud would have to be condescended to in an application grounded upon fraud.

Vehicle Insurers' Rights Vis-a-visSection 96(1) Of The Act

I shall now deal with the first issue. It is on this entirely novel point that motivated - nay, energise - the parties mutually to seek this court's view. A person ought to be made a party in the proceedings if such person is clothed with issues to be pleaded and litigated. What is meant by issues here could only mean issues as to or affecting liability pertaining to the subject matter being litigated. Therefore, the pith and kernel of the issue that arises for determination is whether, in general, vehicle insurers have issues to be pleaded or litigated before the pronouncement of liability.

Section 96(1) of the Act reads as follows:

(1) If, after a certificate of insurance has been delivered under subsection (4) of section 91 to the person by whom a policy has been effected, judgment in respect of any such liabilityas is required to be covered by a policy under paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of section 91 (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy) is given against any person insured by the policy, then notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel, or may have avoided or cancelled the policy, the insurer shall, subject to this section, pay to the persons entitled to the benefit of the judgment any sum payable there under in respect of the liability, including any amount payable in respect of costs and a