(53) The court, through the judgment of Gopal Sri Ram JCA, found, at p 611, that:

It is clear from the authorities that the substantive appeal, based

upon a single point of interpretation, lacks all merit and is doomed to

failure.

(54) On ‘special circumstances’, the learned judge says at p 605:

At one time it was thought that an appellant had to demonstrate that

there were special circumstances warranting a stay of proceedings or of

execution. This was founded on the notion that a successful litigant

ought not to be deprived of the fruits of his litigation. See the case

of The Annot Lyle (1886) 11 PD 114. The authority constantly relied

upon in support of the proposition that special circumstances ought to

be demonstrated before a stay of execution may be granted is the

judgment of Brown J in Serangoon Garden Estate Ltd v Ang Keng

[1953] MLJ 116. For my part, having considered the more recent

authorities on the subject, I have come to the conclusion that that

decision is bad law, and ought no longer to be followed by this court.

(55) The learned judge then quotes from the judgment of Chan Sek Keong JC for the reasons thereof and says at p 607:

For my part, I am unable to see any good reason for our courts to cling

on to a legal test which has been repudiated, for good reasons, by the

courts of the jurisdiction from which that test emanated. In any event,

I find that there is respectable authority in our own jurisdiction that

points to a more practical and less stringent approach to the problem.

(56) For the purpose of the discussion of this judgment later, it is important to reproduce some other parts of the judgment. This is what the learned judge says at pp 610–612:

In my judgment, the paramount consideration governing an application

for a stay, whether of execution or of proceedings, or, in the case of

an application for some other form of interim preservation of the

subject matter of an appeal, such as the grant of an injunction or

other appropriate relief under s 44(1) of the Courts of Judicature Act

1964, is that the appeal to this court, if successful, should not be

rendered nugatory. If upon balancing all the relevant factors, this

court comes to the conclusion that an appeal would be rendered nugatory

without the grant of a stay or other interim preservation order, then,

it should normally direct a stay or grant other appropriate interim

relief that has the effect of maintaining the status quo.

But cases may arise where, in determining the critical question whether

an appeal would be rendered nugatory, this court comes to the

conclusion that the point concerned in the pending appeal is obviously

unarguable. In such cases it would not, as I perceive the law, be a

proper exercise of discretion for this court to shut its eyes to the

practical realities of the situation, and to nevertheless proceed to

grant a stay.

Take this very case. It is clear from the authorities that the

substantive appeal, based upon a single point of interpretation, lacks

all merit and is doomed to failure. In this state of affairs, would it

be a proper exercise of discretion to permit a stay and cause a delay

in the prosecution of the petition? I think not. Apart from the absence

of merits, there are other reasons as well.

Encik Thomas informed this court that his instructions are to consent

to a winding up order at the hearing of the petition. Indeed, the

second respondent has, in para 4 of the affidavit filed in opposition

to the motion, explicitly confirmed this. So, this is not a case where

there will be a bitter opposition to the winding up of the first

respondent. To delay the hearing and disposal of such a case as this

will, in my judgment, cause a manifest injustice to th