The recent transition to the (BNSS) has introduced significant changes to India's , prompting legal experts to scrutinize how these new provisions alter . Among the most closely watched developments is the revision of maintenance regulations for children, specifically the transition from Section 125 of the (Cr.P.C.) to . While the government aimed to streamline procedures, legal scholars warn that the of Section 144 has inadvertently created substantial ambiguities that may disenfranchise married major daughters seeking financial support.
The core of the issue lies in how the BNSS redefines the scope of who is entitled to claim maintenance. Under the previous regime of Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., the framework was strictly "minor-centric." It clearly delineated between minors unable to maintain themselves and a narrow category of major children—those suffering from physical or mental incapacity—who could qualify for support. By contrast, the BNSS has adopted a broader, potentially imprecise language by omitting the term "minor" in clause (b) of Section 144. This deletion has triggered an urgent need for , as the current risks creating an internal contradiction that favors adult sons over married adult daughters.
For legal professionals, the primary concern is the functional redundancy of the new statute. By removing the word "minor" from clause (b), the law ostensibly opens the door for any child—regardless of age—to claim maintenance. However, the legislature simultaneously retained clause (c), which specifically restricts maintenance for major children to those facing
"physical or mental abnormality or injury."
This structural overlap suggests that while clause (b) appears inclusive at first glance, the retention of the restrictive clause (c) creates an interpretive trap. If a major child without a physical disability seeks maintenance, the courts are now left to navigate whether clause (b) applies universally or if the restrictive logic of clause (c) acts as an inherent filter.
The practical impact of this ambiguity is most sharply felt by married major daughters. Academic analysis from the
, suggests that the draft of the BNSS retains traces of the old Cr.P.C. framework without fully reconciling them with the new, broader language. As Anuleena Bhattacharjee and Mayukh Parial observe,
"The retention of clause (c) gives rise to another significant interpretive dilemma regarding the status of married major daughters who are paradoxically both included and excluded within the same statutory framework under BNSS."
This contradiction is further compounded by the that remains in the BNSS, which allows a Magistrate to order maintenance for a married female child only until she attains majority, provided her husband lacks sufficient means. In the context of the previous Cr.P.C. rules, this served a clear purpose within a minor-centric scheme. Under the new BNSS, however, this carry-over is viewed by many as conceptually misplaced. It reinforces an outdated presumption that a woman’s entitlement to support from her parents is strictly tied to her minority or marital status, rather than her underlying need for subsistence.
Observers note that this creates a tangible gender disparity. While the law on its face appears to move toward an inclusive, age-agnostic approach, the structural retention of clauses that explicitly exclude "married daughters" suggests that those specific barriers remain intact for adult women. Consequently, whereas adult sons might plausibly argue for wider maintenance protections under the broad language of clause (b), married daughters are likely to face a higher threshold for entry due to the lingering weight of the exclusionary language in clause (c) and the associated .
The legal community is currently awaiting judicial intervention to resolve these conflicting interpretations. Until a court of record rules on the specific application of Section 144 in cases involving major married women, trial courts are expected to grapple with uncertainty. The risk, according to practitioners, is that inconsistent rulings across different districts could lead to a fragmented application of the law, where the same set of facts yields different maintenance outcomes depending on the court’s interpretation of the behind the BNSS drafting.
Beyond the immediate litigation concerns, this situation highlights a broader challenge for the legal system during the adoption of the BNSS. The transition phase is revealing that subtle drafting changes, while perhaps intended to modernize or consolidate law, often carry unforeseen consequences that necessitate robust judicial review. As the Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita continues to be applied in daily practice, the pressure on the legislature to address these drafting lapses through targeted amendments is growing. Whether the will move to clarify the standing of major children or leave the task to a series of remains the key procedural question.
For now, the legal profession remains in a state of flux. While the intent of the BNSS was to facilitate justice, the current ambiguity surrounding maintenance provisions suggests that until the text is harmonized, the burden of ensuring fair access to support will rest squarely upon the judiciary. The next stage of development will likely involve appellate courts determining whether the inclusive tone of the new act overrides the historical exclusions inherited from the previous criminal procedure code. Until such precedents are established, those advising on family law matters face an uphill task in navigating these statutory contradictions.
statutory interpretation - maintenance rights - legislative ambiguity - gender disparity - family law