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Case Law

FIR for Impersonation as Magistrate and Obstruction Under Sections 170/419 IPC Not Quashed Despite Section 195 CrPC Bar on Section 186: Punjab & Haryana High Court

2025-12-15

Subject: Criminal Law - Quashing of FIR

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FIR for Impersonation as Magistrate and Obstruction Under Sections 170/419 IPC Not Quashed Despite Section 195 CrPC Bar on Section 186: Punjab & Haryana High Court

Supreme Today News Desk

High Court Dismisses Petition to Quash FIR Against Lawyer for Alleged Impersonation as Judicial Magistrate

Chandigarh, December 9, 2025 – The Punjab and Haryana High Court has refused to quash an FIR against budding lawyer Parkash Singh Marwah, who was accused of impersonating a judicial magistrate during a routine traffic check in Chandigarh. Justice Surya Partap Singh, in an oral judgment delivered on December 9, 2025, dismissed the petition, emphasizing that the allegations disclose cognizable offences warranting investigation. The ruling underscores the court's restraint in interfering with police probes at early stages, citing landmark Supreme Court precedents.

Case Overview

The case stems from FIR No. 26 dated May 19, 2024, registered at Police Station Sector-49, UT Chandigarh, under Sections 170, 186, and 419 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). These sections pertain to impersonating a public servant, obstructing a public servant in discharge of duty, and cheating by personation, respectively.

On May 18, 2024, Assistant Sub-Inspector Ajit Singh and Constable Yogesh were on duty at the intersection of Sectors 45/46/49/50 in Chandigarh. They reportedly spotted Marwah driving a Scorpio car (CH-01-CT-2486) with its front number plate obscured by cloth, violating traffic rules. When signaled to stop, Marwah allegedly halted beyond the zebra crossing, refused to produce his driving license, and claimed to be a Judicial Magistrate named "Parkash." Verification revealed the vehicle did not belong to any magistrate, and a judge's sticker was affixed on the windshield. Marwah allegedly fled the scene after misbehaving with the constable and obstructing his duties. He was arrested on May 20, 2024, during the investigation.

Marwah, invoking Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), sought quashing of the FIR, alleging it was a retaliatory action by Chandigarh Police due to his prior complaints against administrative lapses, including one against a DSP of Traffic Police (Annexures P-2 and P-3).

Petitioner's Arguments

Represented by Advocate Hardial Singh Baath, Marwah contended that the FIR was fabricated out of vengeance. He claimed that on the incident date, he was crossing the intersection with his ailing mother when plainclothes officers stopped him without uniform, leading to an objection misinterpreted as obstruction. Marwah denied any traffic violations or impersonation, asserting the story was concocted to implicate him in non-bailable offences.

Key legal pleas included:

- Procedural Bar under Section 195(1) CrPC : Cognizance of offences under Section 186 IPC requires a written complaint from the concerned public servant, barring direct FIR registration. Citing Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana (1998(1) CLR 63) and Ashok v. State (1987 Cri LJ 1750), it was argued that intertwined offences under Sections 332 and 353 IPC could not be split, rendering the entire FIR invalid.

- Mental Health Immunity : Marwah claimed post-incident depression requiring counseling, invoking Section 84 IPC (act of a person of unsound mind) and Devidas Loka Rathod v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 2018 SC 3093) for protection.

- Abuse of Process : Relying on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335), R.P. Kapoor v. State of Punjab (AIR 1960 SC 866), and Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303, he urged quashing to prevent harassment, noting video footage would vindicate him in trial.

Marwah described himself as a socially active lawyer from a reputed family, with no prior criminal history.

State's Response

Additional Public Prosecutor Ganesh Sharma defended the FIR, highlighting the seriousness of Marwah's alleged impersonation to evade traffic checks and obstruction of duty. The state argued:

- The Section 195 CrPC bar applies only to Section 186 IPC, not to Sections 170/419 IPC, making the offences separable.

- No evidence of mental unsoundness at the time of the offence; any post-incident claims must be raised in trial court.

- Video evidence exists, and quashing would undermine investigation. Citing Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2021 SCC OnLine SC 315), the state urged dismissal, emphasizing courts' limited role in early-stage probes.

Court's Analysis and Key Precedents

Justice Surya Partap Singh identified three issues:

(i) falsity of allegations,

(ii) applicability of Section 195 CrPC bar, and

(iii) immunity under Section 84 IPC.

On the first, the court held that specific allegations of traffic violation, impersonation, and fleeing disclose cognizable offences, precluding quashing without evidence assessment. It invoked Neeharika Infrastructure guidelines, stressing police's investigative duty and courts' restraint: "Courts would not thwart any investigation into cognizable offences" and quashing is for "rarest of rare cases." Bhajan Lal criteria were applied, finding no absurdity or legal bar to proceed. Recent Supreme Court rulings in Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 4728 of 2025), M/s Balaji Traders v. State of U.P. (2025(3) RCR (Criminal) 175), and Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Criminal Appeal No. 4752 of 2025) reinforced non-interference unless exceptional circumstances exist.

A pivotal excerpt: "Without proper appreciation of evidence... it is not possible to arrive at a conclusion as to whether which of the two stories is true."

For the second issue, offences under Sections 170/419 IPC are independent of Section 186 IPC, allowing prosecution despite the bar on the latter. The plea must be raised at charge-framing, not quashing stage. Ram Kumar and Ashok were distinguished as inapplicable to separable offences.

On the third, no claim of unsound mind at the offence's time was made; post-incident depression does not justify quashing, to be addressed in trial.

Final Decision and Implications

The court dismissed the petition, finding no merit in quashing grounds. "The present petition being devoid of merit deserves dismissal," Justice Singh ruled, disposing of pending applications.

This decision reinforces judicial caution in quashing FIRs, prioritizing investigations for serious allegations like impersonation, which undermine public trust in institutions. It signals to accused persons that procedural bars and personal hardships must be litigated at trial, not pre-emptively. For Marwah, proceedings continue, potentially hinging on video evidence. Legal experts note it aligns with evolving jurisprudence limiting high court interventions to prevent "mini-trials" at quashing stages.

#FIRQuashing #CriminalLaw #Impersonation

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