Former CJI Chandrachud's 'Desecration' Remark Sparks Debate on Ayodhya Verdict's Legal Basis

NEW DELHI – In a move that has sent ripples through the Indian legal and political landscape, former Chief Justice of India (CJI) D.Y. Chandrachud has ignited a significant controversy with post-retirement remarks that appear to diverge sharply from the text and reasoning of the unanimous 2019 Ayodhya judgment he co-authored. In an interview, the former CJI described the 16th-century construction of the Babri Masjid as "the fundamental act of desecration," a statement that critics argue reframes the landmark verdict and contradicts its carefully worded legal foundations.

The comments, made during an interview with journalist Sreenivasan Jain for Newslaundry , have prompted intense scrutiny from the legal community, raising profound questions about judicial propriety, the separation of personal conviction from legal reasoning, and the enduring legacy of one of India's most consequential court rulings.

The Controversial Statement and its Apparent Contradiction

The crux of the controversy lies in Justice Chandrachud's response to a question regarding a critical reading of the judgment, which suggested that Hindu parties were rewarded for committing illegal acts (like placing idols in 1949) while the Muslim parties were disadvantaged for not engaging in similar contestation.

The former CJI retorted, "When you said that it was the Hindus who were desecrating the inner courtyard, what about the fundamental act of desecration- the very erection of the Mosque. You forget all that happened? We forget what happened in history?"

This characterization stands in stark contrast to the explicit findings of the five-judge bench's 1,045-page judgment. While the verdict acknowledged the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) report, which found a pre-existing "underlying structure" of Hindu origin, it included several crucial caveats. Most notably, the Court concluded that title could not be decided on archaeological findings alone and that there was no conclusive evidence to prove the pre-existing structure was demolished for the purpose of constructing the mosque.

The judgment stated unequivocally: "A finding of title cannot be based in law on the archaeological findings which have been arrived at by ASI... No evidence has been placed on the record in relation to the course of human history between the twelfth and sixteen centuries. No evidence is available in a case of this antiquity on (i) the cause of destruction of the underlying structure; and (ii) whether the pre-existing structure was demolished for the construction of the mosque."

Journalist Sreenivasan Jain repeatedly highlighted this contradiction during the interview, pointing out the judgment’s finding of a four-century gap between the underlying structure and the mosque, and the lack of evidence for a deliberate demolition. Justice Chandrachud, however, insisted on the presence of "adequate evidence from the archaeological excavation," adding that critics often have a "selective view of history" and "have not read the judgment."

Reconciling 'Desecration' with 'Adverse Possession'

Legal experts are now grappling with how to reconcile the former CJI's emphasis on historical "desecration" with the judgment's stated legal basis. When asked if a historical act of desecration could justify the 1992 demolition of the Babri Masjid, Justice Chandrachud replied, "Not at all." He maintained that the verdict was based on settled law.

"Supreme Court judgment applies conventional yardsticks of determining the adverse possession and it is on the basis of evidence and conventional yardsticks that we have applied and come to the conclusion," he asserted.

This dichotomy is precisely what has alarmed legal observers. The 2019 judgment itself found that the Muslim parties could not prove exclusive and uninterrupted possession, a key element for an adverse possession claim against the state, and that Hindus had established continuous worship in the outer courtyard. The final decision to grant the entire disputed site to the Hindu parties, using the Court's powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, was presented as a measure to ensure justice and peace.

However, the former CJI's new emphasis on the mosque's erection as a "fundamental act of desecration" suggests that a narrative of correcting a historical wrong may have been a more influential, albeit unstated, factor in the bench's reasoning than the formal text of the judgment allows. This raises concerns about whether the verdict was truly an application of "conventional yardsticks" or a form of restorative justice cloaked in the language of property law.

Backlash and Broader Implications

The reaction from the legal fraternity has been swift and sharp. Senior Advocate Prashant Bhushan accused the former CJI of laying "bare his communal mindset," stating, "He says destruction of Temple 500 yrs ago (of which there was no evidence) is good reason to give the land to the destroyers of the mosque now!"

Bhushan and others have connected these remarks to other controversial decisions, including the order allowing a survey of the Gyanvapi mosque, arguing it undermines the spirit of the Places of Worship Act, 1991. The Ayodhya judgment had, ironically, hailed the Act as a legislative instrument designed to "preserve the secular character of the nation."

Author and lawyer Suchitra Vijayan commented that the remarks should "surprise no one who has actually read the judgment" and that what often passes for progressiveness is "really just a liberal-linguistic performance."

The controversy underscores a long-standing debate on the propriety of post-retirement interviews by judges. While offering transparency and insight, they also risk demystifying the judicial process in a way that can erode public confidence, especially when personal reflections appear to contradict the official, collective reasoning of a multi-judge bench.

For legal professionals and scholars, Justice Chandrachud's comments necessitate a critical re-examination of the Ayodhya verdict. Was it a pragmatic resolution rooted in property law, or was it a moral judgment on history? His interview has inadvertently opened the door to the very criticism he sought to deflect—that the judgment was, at its core, influenced by considerations beyond the strict confines of evidence and settled legal principles. As the dust settles, the Indian judiciary may find itself confronting difficult questions about its processes, the transparency of its reasoning, and the indelible line between law and history.