Friendship No License for Rape: Delhi High Court Denies Anticipatory Bail, Citing Victim's Trauma and New Penal Codes

New Delhi – In a significant ruling that underscores the judiciary's protective stance in cases of sexual assault against minors, the Delhi High Court has emphatically stated that friendship does not grant a "license to rape." While denying anticipatory bail to a man accused of repeatedly sexually assaulting and beating his 17-year-old neighbour, Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma delivered a strong message against using a pre-existing friendly relationship as a defense to invalidate serious criminal allegations under the POCSO Act.

The decision in SUMIT SINGH v. STATE NCT OF DELHI AND ANR is notable not only for its firm interpretation of consent but also for its application of provisions from the new Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, and Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023. The Court dismissed the accused's plea, citing the gravity of the allegations, prima facie corroboration by medical evidence, and the applicant's consistent failure to cooperate with the investigation.

Case Background and Allegations

The matter came before the High Court after the accused, Sumit Singh, sought pre-arrest bail in an FIR registered at Police Station Sangam Vihar, Delhi. He was charged under several sections of the new penal code, including Section 64(2) (Rape), 115(2) (Voluntarily causing hurt), 127(2) (Wrongful confinement), and 351 (Criminal intimidation) of the BNS, 2023, read with Section 4 (Punishment for penetrative sexual assault) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012.

The case was initiated based on a complaint by a 17-year-old girl who alleged that the accused, a neighbour she had known for several years, took her to his friend's house in Govindpuri on June 26, 2025. There, he allegedly beat her, wrongfully confined her, and subjected her to repeated sexual assault. The complainant stated that the accused threatened to kill her if she disclosed the incident, causing her to remain silent out of fear.

She was found by the police at a metro station the next day but did not reveal the assault and refused a medical examination. The FIR was ultimately lodged 11 days later, on July 5, 2025, after an altercation between the mothers of the victim and the accused prompted the girl to confide in her mother. Subsequently, her medical examination was conducted at AIIMS, and her detailed statement was recorded under Section 183 of the BNSS.

Arguments Before the High Court

The defense counsel argued for anticipatory bail on several grounds. They contended that the relationship between the accused and the victim was consensual and that the FIR was a product of a pre-existing dispute between their families. The defense highlighted what it termed an "inordinate delay of 11 days" in lodging the FIR and pointed to a discrepancy regarding the date of the incident as evidence of a fabricated case. They also submitted that the applicant had clean antecedents.

The State, represented by the Additional Public Prosecutor, vehemently opposed the bail application. The prosecution argued that the allegations were of a very serious nature and the investigation was still at a nascent stage. It was submitted that the accused's custodial interrogation was necessary to ascertain the exact location of the crime and other crucial facts. The prosecution also expressed concerns that the applicant could intimidate the victim if granted bail.

Court's Analysis: No Concession for Delay, No License in Friendship

Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma meticulously dismantled the defense's arguments, holding that they were matters for trial and could not be grounds for granting anticipatory bail at this stage.

On the Argument of a Consensual Relationship:

The Court's most trenchant observation came in response to the defense's claim that the friendship between the parties implied consent. Justice Sharma unequivocally rejected this notion, stating:

“The contention on behalf of the applicant that the applicant and the complainant were friends and therefore, it could be a case of consensual relationship, cannot be accepted by this Court, since even if the parties concerned were friends, friendship does not give any license to the applicant to rape the victim repeatedly, confine her in his friend's house and beat her mercilessly…”

This statement sets a clear judicial precedent, reinforcing the legal principle that in cases involving a minor, consent is immaterial, and a prior relationship cannot be used to mitigate the gravity of sexual assault allegations, particularly at the pre-trial stage.

On Delay and Victim's Trauma:

The Court showed a sensitive and nuanced understanding of the psychological state of a minor victim of sexual assault. It dismissed the argument regarding the 11-day delay in filing the FIR, attributing it directly to the trauma and fear experienced by the complainant.

“This Court is of the view that being a minor, she was under trauma and a sense of shame that had precluded her from disclosing anything to her parents and the police, as evidenced from her statement that she did not want to be medically examined in presence of her parents or inform the police about it, while her parents were present,” the Court observed.

This reasoning affirms the established legal position that delays in reporting sexual offenses, especially by minors, must be viewed through the lens of victim psychology and cannot automatically discredit the prosecution's case.

Corroborative Evidence and Non-Cooperation:

The Court found that the allegations were not baseless but were prima facie supported by the material on record. The victim's detailed statement under Section 183 of the BNSS and the Medico-Legal Certificate (MLC) were crucial. The judgment noted that the MLC revealed a "linear bruise under the left eye of the victim, besides a mild abrasion (0.5 cm) on posterior fourchette and a broken hymen," which lent credence to her account of physical and sexual assault.

Furthermore, the applicant's conduct weighed heavily against him. The Court noted that this was not his first attempt to secure pre-arrest bail and that he had consistently evaded the investigation. “The applicant has still not joined the investigation, despite his anticipatory bail application having been either withdrawn or rejected on four occasions in the past,” the order stated. This non-cooperation was a key factor in the Court's decision to deny him the discretionary relief of anticipatory bail.

Legal Implications for Practitioners

This judgment serves as a vital touchstone for legal professionals handling POCSO and sexual assault cases. Key takeaways include:

1. Defense of Consent in POCSO Cases: The ruling solidifies the principle that arguments of "friendship" or "consensual relationship" are non-starters in POCSO matters at the bail stage. The Court's powerful "no license" declaration provides strong quotable authority for prosecutors.
2. Judicial Approach to Delay: The decision reaffirms that courts are increasingly attuned to the psycho-social reasons for delayed reporting in sexual assault cases. Defense counsel must be prepared for such arguments to be viewed as matters of trial rather than grounds for pre-arrest bail.
3. Application of New Sanhitas: This case provides an early glimpse into the High Court's application of the BNS and BNSS. The reference to the victim's statement being recorded under Section 183 BNSS indicates a seamless transition and judicial acceptance of the new procedural framework.
4. Importance of Accused's Conduct: The judgment highlights that an accused's conduct, particularly a refusal to join the investigation despite multiple opportunities, is a critical factor that can tilt the scales against them in a bail hearing.

Concluding its order, the Court found no merit in the application. “Therefore, in view of the foregoing circumstances, coupled with the serious nature of allegations levelled in the present case, prima facie corroborated by the material on record, this Court finds that no case for grant of anticipatory bail is made out,” Justice Sharma ruled, dismissing the plea while clarifying that the observations are prima facie and will not influence the trial on merits.